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McWilliams: Limited Liability Law Practice

LIMITED LIABILITY LAW PRACTICE
MARTIN C. MCWILLIAMS, JR.

Almost forty years ago, legislatures began enacting professional
corporation statutes' that permit professionals to organize as corporations
and thereby limit their exposure to personal liability. The professional
corporation has proven very popular among lawyers, including South
Carolina lawyers.
In recent years, as exposure to liability in law practice has expanded
beyond traditional limits2 and malpractice judgments have soared,3 legislatures have provided professionals with two additional limited liability
formats: limited liability partnerships (LLPs) and limited liability companies (LLCs). This is a national trend4 of which South Carolina is a part.5

* Associate Professor of Law, University of South Carolina. Thanks to Ellen Gardner
Glenn, Holly Jensen, and Elizabeth Carpenter for their able and cheerful research assistance.
1. Also known as professional associations, such corporations are designed to be owned
by professionals who are also its employees. Generally speaking, the owner/employees are
not personally liable for obligations of the corporation unless they render themselves liable
by committing malpractice, or negligently hiring or supervising another employee who
commits malpractice. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 33-19-101 to -700 (Law. Co-op. 1990
& Supp. 1997) ("S.C. Professional Corporation Supplement"); see also Jennifer J. Johnson,
Limited Liabilityfor Lawyers: General PartnersNeed Not Apply, 51 Bus. LAw. 85, 92-98
(1995).
2. For example, lawyers' liability has been extended to subject firms to punitive
damages in some cases. See Johnson, supra note 1, at 85-86 & n.4; Victoria Slind-Flor,
Megafirm Socked on Punitives, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 12, 1994, at A4 (awarding of $7.1 million
punitive damages against Baker & McKenzie law firm). Lawyers have also been held liable
to parties other than clients. See Johnson, supra note 1, at 86-87 & nn.5-7 ("[L]awyers today
face potential liability from a host of new sources that include non-client third parties,
government regulators, and court-imposed Rule 11 sanctions." (footnotes omitted)); Mark
Rosencrantz, Comment, You Wanna Do What? Attorneys Organizing as Limited Liability
Partnershipsand Companies: An Economic Analysis, 19 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 349, 368-69
(1996) (noting that courts have begun to reject the lack of privity defense in attorney
malpractice actions).
3. See Johnson, supra note 1, at 87-89; Rosencrantz, supranote 2, at 350 (finding the
partners of Kaye Scholer were personally liable for $16 million in the Lincoln Savings &
Loan matter after the firn's malpractice insurance covered the first $25 million of liability);
Jury OrdersLaw Firm to Pay $4.55 Million, Hous. CHRON., Mar. 25, 1993, at 3; Slind-Flor,
supranote 2, at A4; Some Law Firms Were Hit by Massive Suits, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 26, 1994,
at Cll; Harry J. Haynsworth, Business Lawyers Under Fire: Liability and Ethical Risks,
Q246 ALI-ABA 23, 25 (1996) ("As of October, 1993, the Resolution Trust Corporation had
entered into settlements with 31 law firms for a total of $202 million.").
4. By 1983, every state had enacted professional corporation legislation. See MODEL
Bus. CORP. ACT, PROF'L CORP. SuPP. PC-46 to PC-48 (1996) (listing the statutes for all fifty
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Again, lawyers, along with other professionals, have taken advantage.6
Insofar as they provide non-traditional formats for the practice of law,
the professional corporation, LLP, and LLC statutes represent legislative
exercises in lawyer regulation. Are such legislative incursions into lawyer
regulation acceptable in light of the courts' powers and responsibilities to
regulate the practice of law? The few courts around the country that have
addressed this question have divided in their results, but are uniform in
their assertion of the courts' paramount powers over lawyer regulation and
their responsibilities to exercise this power to protect the lawyer-client
relationship. Do these new statutes, which purport to insulate lawyers from
vicarious malpractice liability,' unduly erode the lawyer-client relationship?
This paper evaluates these questions and the surrounding issues in
terms of South Carolina court rules, cases, and constitutional provisions.
Part I consists of historical and legislative background, and concludes that,
structurally speaking, LLCs and LLPs are no less suitable as formats for
the practice of law than the now-familiar professional corporation.' From

states in an Annotation). Many states have LLP Acts, and most have LLC Acts. See Ronald
E. Mallen, Ethics/Malpractice Issues: The Professional and Ethical Issues Facing the
Attorney-Employee, in THE BEST ENTITY FOR DOING THE DEAL 1996, at 996 nn.18-21 (PLI
Corp. Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. B4-7143, 1996); Rosencrantz, supra note
2, at 356 n.49, 357 n.57; see also Mark A. Cohen, Law Firms Registering as LLPs in
Droves, MAss. LAW. WKLY., June 10, 1996, at I (noting the wave of law firms reorganizing
as LLPs).
5. South Carolina's General Assembly enacted a professional corporation statute in
1962, and replaced it with the present statute, the South Carolina Professional Corporation
Supplement in 1988. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 33-19-101 to -700 (Law. Co-op. 1990 & Supp.
1997) ("S.C. Professional Corporation Supplement"). In 1994, the General Assembly added
statutes permitting professionals to organize as LLCs, S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 33-43-101 to 1409 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997) ("1994 LLC Act"), and LLPs, S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 33-4120(6), -210, -370, -510, -960, -1010, -1060, -1110 to -1220 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997) ("LLP
Act"). In 1996, the General Assembly replaced the 1994 LLC Act in its entirety with the
South Carolina Uniform Limited Liability Company Act of 1996, which does not expressly
contemplate use by professionals. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 33-44-101 to -1207 (Law. Co-op.
Supp. 1997) ("1996 LLC Act").
6. Although neither the South Carolina Bar nor the Secretary of State's office maintains
official statistics of this nature, an informal review of firm names listed in MartindaleHubbell indicates that of the approximately 540 firms listed in South Carolina, 244 were
PCs, 4 were LLCs, and 58 were LLPs. The balance consisted of general partnerships and
sole practitioners. 14 MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW DIRECTORY SCIB-SC299B (1996). This
count does not consider members of firms who were themselves PCs.
7. For the sense in which this term is used, see infra text accompanying note 107-109.
8. In South Carolina, the firmness of this conclusion is diminished by the failure of the
1996 LLC Act to include provisions contemplating professional service companies, as did
the 1994 LLC Act, the LLP Act, and the S. C. Professional Corporation Supplement.
Compare S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-41-370(D) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997) (professional-services

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol49/iss3/4

2

McWilliams: Limited Liability Law Practice

1998]

LIMITED LIABILITY LAW PRACTICE

this conclusion it follows that the next question addressed by this article is
to what extent is the practice of law in any limited liability format
appropriate in South Carolina? Part II considers the basis of the lawyerclient relationship and its function in lawyer regulation. Part III reviews
the national case law addressing the issue of limited-liability law practice,
and the arguments for and against such practice. This Part concludes that
while persuasive practical arguments favor limiting lawyers' liability, courts
should consider retaining vicarious malpractice liability in particular cases.
Vicarious malpractice liability is principled, and it engages important
informing values of the lawyer-client relationship. In addition, abandoning
vicarious liability represents a transfer of risk and cost from lawyers to
their clients. Part IV reviews South Carolina constitutional and implied
court powers, and concludes that South Carolina courts have the discretionary power to regulate lawyers practicing as professional corporations,
LLPs, and LLCs, to the extent necessary to preserve the lawyer-client
relationship.
I.

HISTORICAL AND LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND

A. The Advent of Limited-Liability Law Practice
Traditionally, people in this country practiced law and other professions
in general partnerships or as sole practitioners. 9 These practice formats
render all members in the firm personally liable for all obligations of the
practice, including one another's professional lapses or misconduct."° The
corporate practice of law was prohibited." In the first half of this century
liability provisions of South Carolina Uniform Partnership Act), and S.C. CODE ANN. § 3343-304(B) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997) (repealed effective Jan. 1, 2001) (detailing liability
provisions for individuals rendering professional services), with S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-44-

303 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997) (citing liability provisions which fail to mention professional
services). However, the 1996 LLC Act does appear to contemplate, by implication, use by
professionals. Cf. S.C.

CODE ANN. § 33-44-112 cmt. (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997) ("A limited
liability company may be organized for any lawful purpose unless the State has specifically
prohibited a company from engaging in a specific activity."). The 1996 LLC Act does not

echo the client protections of the other South Carolina limited liability formats, specifically
the professional corporation. E.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-19-130 (licensing requirement for

rendering professional services); § 33-19-140 (setting forth prohibited activities of
professional corporations); § 33-19-320 (explaining confidentiality requirements between
clients and professional corporation employees); § 33-19-340 (privileged communications).

Presumably, these client protections are left to the professions' governing regulations. E.g.,
MODEL RULEs OF PROFESSIONAL CoNmucr (1992).
9. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 1, at 92; Rosencrantz, supra note 2, at 369-70.
10. See Johnson, supra note 1, at 85; Michael J. Lawrence, Note, The Fortified Law
Firm: Limited Liability Business and the Propriety of Lawyer Incorporation, 9 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHics 207, 212 (1995).
11. One commentator has identified five reasons for the historical ban on the corporate
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the prohibition was a matter of common law in South Carolina.

2

Such

statutory regulation of the practice of law as existed at the time contemplated practice only by individuals. 13 The prohibition found expression, along
with other aspects of the unlimited-liability model, in the American Bar

Association's Canons,14 which South Carolina and other states adopted'"
as disciplinary rules.' 6 In 1946, the Legislature banned the practice of law
by corporations in South Carolina. 7 The statutory ban has carried
through into the current Code.'"
The development of the professional corporation during the late 1950s
foreshadowed the end of the ban on corporate law practice. This development, designed to eliminate some of the differences between professions
and commercial businesses,' 9 had two principle objectives. The first
objective was to make corporate tax and benefit treatment available to
Many of the disparities in this area dropped away,
professionals."

practice of law: (1) the ineligibility of a corporation for a license to practice law; (2) the
personal relationship between lawyer and client, unsustainable by a corporation; (3) the
prospect of a lawyer's conflicting duties to corporation and client; (4) the lack of
professional discipline over the corporation; and (5) the shielding of lawyers from joint and
several malpractice liability. Lawrence, supra note 10, at 210 (citing ROBERT W. HILLMAN,
HILLMAN ON LAWYER MOBILITY: THE LAW AND ETHics OF PARTNER WITHDRAWAL AND

LAW FIRM BREAKUPS § 6.1 (1994)).
12. See, e.g., State ex rel. Daniel v. Wells, 191 S.C. 468, 480, 5 S.E.2d 181, 186 (1939)
(noting that a corporation cannot practice law, but can only act through natural persons under
agency principles).
13. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 312 (Michie 1932) (superseded 1942) (forbidding the
practice of law by any person not admitted and sworn as an attorney).
14. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHics (1908).
15. S.C. Sup. CT. R. 33 (Michie & Law. Co-op. Supp. 1960) (adopted June 12, 1956)
(superseded 1976) (adopting ABA Canons of Professional Ethics as disciplinary rules in
South Carolina).
16. "No lawyer shall permit his professional services, or his name to be used in aid of,
or to make possible, the unauthorized practice of law by any lay agency, personal or
corporate." S.C. Sup. CT. R 33, Canon 47 (Michie & Law. Co-op. Supp. 1960) (superseded
1976).
17. S.C. CODE ANN. § 333-4 (Supp. 1946) (superseded 1952).
18. S.C. CODE ANN. § 40-5-320 (Law. Co-op. 1986).
19. Cf Dirk G. Christensen & Scott F. Bertschi, LLC Statutes: Use by Attorneys, 29
GA. L. REv. 693, 702 (1995) ("One of the primary purposes of the Georgia LLC Act, like
the Professional Corporation Act that preceded it, is to place members of limited liability
companies on a par with the shareholders of ordinary business corporations.").
20. Inferentially downplaying limited liability, tax and benefit enhancement were often
cited as the primary motivation for permitting law practice in the corporate form. See, e.g.,
In re The Florida Bar, 133 So. 2d 554, 555-56 (Fla. 1961) (allowing the practice of law as

a professional corporation because of tax benefits); In re Bar Ass'n of Haw., 516 P.2d 1267,
1268 (Haw. 1973) ("[The Bar Association's] principal motive in seeking permission for its
members to incorporate is to enable the attorneys of this State to qualify for the federal tax
advantages which would accompany such incorporation.... Therefore, we have concluded
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however, with amendments to the Internal Revenue Code during the
1980s.21 Commentators no longer consider tax consequences to provide
a substantial motive for incorporation by professionals. 2
The second objective of the professional corporation was to permit
professionals to limit their exposure to personal liability for the obligations
of their businesses.'
To this end, professional corporation statutes

that [incorporated attorneys'] liability shall not be limited."); Birt v. St. Mary Mercy Hosp.
of Gary, Inc., 370 N.E.2d 379, 382-83 (Ind. CL App. 1977) (in holding that there was no
vicarious liability for shareholders of a medical professional corporation for the tort of a
physician employee, the court stated that Indiana passed the professional corporation statute
"to enable professionals to form tax-favored corporations"); In re Rhode Island Bar Ass'n,
263 A.2d 692, 695 (RI. 1970) (allowing attorneys to practice law in a professional
corporation, and thus reap tax benefits if they apply to the supreme court).
Prior to 1982, partnerships were disadvantaged, compared with corporations, in the
pension and benefit area. For example, deferral of income through qualified pension plans
was available only to "employees." I.RC. § 401(a)(4) (1954). Partners did not qualify as
employees, while corporate principals did. Rev. Rul. 61-157, pt. 2(e)(1), 1961-2 C.B. 67, 71
(declared obsolete by Rev. Rul. 72-488, 1972-2 CB 649). Additionally, prior to 1986, the
marginal corporate tax rate was significantly lower than the rates for individuals and
partnerships. See Nancy Thoma, Note, Partnership Interest Abandonment:
Loss
Characterization, 18 J. CoRP. L. 101, 102 (1992). The above factors combined made
corporate tax treatment desirable.
Initially, the Internal Revenue Service resisted taxing professional corporations as
corporations. Defeated on this issue in United States v. Kintner, 216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir.
1954), the I.R.S. reversed its position. S. REP. No. 91-522, 1969-3 C.B. 423, 594-95 (citing
Tech. Info. Rel. 1969-1019 (Aug. 8, 1969)). The Service issued the so-called "Kintner
Regulations" to determine whether an unincorporated association would be taxed as a
corporation or a partnership. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a) (1960). Under these regulations,
limited liability was one of the factors indicating corporateness. Id. § 301.7701-2(d); see
Note, Professional Corporations and Associations, 75 HARV. L. REv. 776, 778-85 (1962).
The Kintner Regulations were rescinded effective January 1, 1997, with the advent of "check

the box" regulations, pursuant to which unincorporated associations can choose whether to
be taxed as a corporation or partnership, regardless of their characteristics. T.D. 8697, 1997-

2 I.R.B.11.
21. The advantageous tax treatment of retirement benefits was extended to partnerships

by 1982. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.); Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of
1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26
U.S.C.). The disparity between corporate and individual tax rates was narrowed in 1986.
These reforms effectively eliminated most of the tax reasons to seek incorporation. Tax

Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2249 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 26 U.S.C.); see David Paas, Professional Corporations and Attorney-Shareholders: The Decline of Limited Liability, 11 J. CORP. L. 371, 373 n.14-17 (1986).
22. Johnson, supra note 1, at 138-39; Paas, supra note 21, at 372-74.
23. See Paas, supra note 21, at 374. In addition to the advantage of limitation of
personal liability, limited liability was one of the indicia of corporateness cited in Kintner,

216 F.2d at 429.
Creation of the separate person of the corporation resulted in some unforeseen
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typically include a version of the corporate veil.24 South Carolina has
adopted a version which has been given effect when adopted by other
states.' Limited personal liability-downplayed in the early days as an
attribute of the professional corporation format, especially in the field of
law practice 26-- is now said to be the primary motivation for professionals

to organize as professional corporations.27
Because the professional corporation concept contradicted traditional

notions of law practice, it was greeted with uncertainty in the legal

community.2" Generalized early criticisms of law practice in professional

consequences. For example, a general partner is protected from personal tort liability by
workers' compensation statutes, but a shareholder of a professional corporation is not so
protected and may be personally liable. See, e.g., Lyon v. Barrett, 445 A.2d 1153 (N.J.
1982).
24. For example, the Model Professional Corporation Supplement offers adopting
legislatures three choices: not limiting liability, limiting liability through a corporate veil,
or limiting liability through some evidence of financial responsibility such as insurance or
bonds. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT, PROF'L CORP. SUPP. § 34 (1996). The South Carolina
General Assembly chose the corporate veil alternative: "Except as otherwise provided by
statute, the personal liability of a shareholder of a... professional corporation is no greater
in any respect than the liability of a shareholder of a corporation incorporated under the
South Carolina Business Corporation Act." S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-19-340(c) (Law. Co-op.
1990). The South Carolina Business Corporation Act provides that "a shareholder.., is not
personally liable for the acts or debts of the corporation except that he may become
personally liable by reason of his own acts or conduct." S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-6-220(b)
(Law. Co-op 1990); see also, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1513 (McKinney 1986) (making
the New York Business Corporation Law applicable to professional service corporations).
25. The S. C. Professional Corporation Supplement provides that a professional
providing services as a professional corporation employee "is not liable ... for the conduct
of other employees of the corporation unless he is at fault in appointing, supervising, or
cooperating with them." S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-19-340(a) (Law. Co-op. 1990). The South
Carolina Reporter's Comment to this Code section observes that similarly-worded provisions
have been given effect. Id. S.C. Rep. cmt. For this proposition the Reporter cites Grayson
v. Jones, 710 P.2d 76 (Nev. 1985), and Birt v. St. Mary Mercy Hospital of Gary, Inc., 370
N.E.2d 379 (Ind. Ct. App. 1977). Grayson, a one-page per curiam opinion, enforces a
statutory limitation of liability in a law corporation without discussion of, or even reference
to, the rule-making power of the court. Grayson, 710 P.2d at 76. Birt is a medical
malpractice case; thus, its result is inapplicable to law practice. See also Gershuny v. Martin
McFall Messenger Anesthesia Prof'l Ass'n, 539 So. 2d 1131 (Fla. 1989) (shareholders not
liable for negligence of anesthesiologist practicing in a professional corporation); Sloan v.
Metropolitan Health Council of Indianapolis, Inc., 516 N.E.2d 1104 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987)
(finding HMO liable under doctrine of respondeat superior even though it did not
incorporate); Boyd v. Badenhausen, 556 S.W.2d 896 (Ky. 1977) (holding the physicianshareholder liable for negligent supervision).
26. See Robert R. Keatinge & George W. Coleman, The Right Entity May Limit Your
Liability, L. PRAC. MGMoT., July/Aug. 1995, at 22, 24; Lawrence, supra note 10, at 224.
27. See Paas, supra note 21, at 374 ("If there is any reason left to incorporate a
professional practice, it cannot be a tax reason .... The most significant nontax reason for
incorporating a professional practice is to obtain limited liability.").
28. See Melby v. O'Melia, 286 N.W.2d 373, 375 (Wis. Ct. App. 1979) ("Attorneys are
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corporations centered on the risk to the lawyer-client relationship,29
including the risk that clients' interests might be compromised by the
limitation of liability.3"
Proponents of the professional corporation
addressed these criticisms by incorporating key elements of the lawyerclient relationship into professional corporation statutes.3' This was
parallelled by the acceptance in 1961 by the ABA of law practice in the
corporate form32 within the limits of professional corporation statutes.33
The protections in the statutes in turn found expression in the ABA Model
Code of Professional Responsibility, adopted in 1969," a and promulgated
in a unique position because their profession is governed by specific ethical standards, and
we cannot say that in all situations a service corporation composed of lawyers will be treated
like a regular business corporation.").
29. In re The Florida Bar, 133 So. 2d 554, 556 (Fla. 1961) ("Traditionally, prohibition
against the practice of a profession through the corporate entity has been grounded on the
essentially personal relationship existing between the lawyer and his client."); In re Opinion
of the Justices, 194 N.E. 313, 317 (Mass. 1935); In re Co-operative Law Co., 92 N.E. 15,
16 (N.Y. 1910); Rhode Island Bar Ass'n v. Automobile Serv. Ass'n, 179 A. 139, 145 (R.I.
1935); Richmond Ass'n of Credit Men, Inc. v. Bar Ass'n, 189 S.E. 153, 157-59 (Va. 1937);
HAROLD GILL REUSCHLEIN & WILLIAM A. GREGORY, THE LAW OF AGENCY AND
PARTNERSHIP § 299, at 502 (2d ed. 1990); Rosencrantz, supra note 2, at 352-54.
30. See generallyNote, supra note 20, at 789 ("IT]he enabling of limited liability seems
an inroad upon traditionally rigorous notions of legal responsibility. The fund available to
compensate a wronged client is diminished.").
31. The notion that professional corporations would insulate lawyers from their own
professional negligence was dispelled by application of the traditional tort rule that every
tortfeasor is personally liable for his own torts. See, e.g. ABA/BNA, LAWYERS MANUAL
ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 91:301 (1998) ("mhe professional corporation does not permit
a lawyer to avoid liability arising out of his own professional obligations."). The S. C.

Professional Corporation Supplement, for example, provides that any professional "is liable
for a negligent or wrongful act ... to the same extent as if he [were] a sole practitioner."
S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-19-340(a) (Law. Co-op. 1990). Agency rules were incorporated in
provisions rendering a professional liable for the torts of others in the corporation to the
extent that the professional "is at fault in appointing, supervising, or cooperating with" the
tortfeasor. Id. Liability of lawyer/shareholders of professional corporations for their own
professional misconduct is well-established. See, e.g., The FloridaBar, 133 So. 2d at 556;
American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Clarke & Van Wagner, Inc., 692 P.2d 61, 67 (Okla.
Ct. App. 1984) ("The professional corporation was never intended as a shield to protect
individual attorneys from liability for their [own] actions.").
The professional corporation's liability as an entity for attorney misconduct is also wellestablished. See, e.g., The Florida Bar, 133 So. 2d at 556.
32. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 303 (1961).
33. Formal Opinion 303 provides that attorneys may practice in corporate form if: (1)
the lawyer rendering the legal services remains personally liable to the client; (2) restrictions
on the liability of other lawyers in the organization are made apparent to the client; (3) none
of the stockholders are non-lawyers, and provisions are in place for transfer back to lawyers
of any stock that falls into the hands of a layperson; (4) there are no profit-sharing plans
including employees who are non-lawyers; and (5) no layperson is permitted to participate
in the management of the firm. Id.
34. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 3-101(A) (1980) ("A
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widely (including in South Carolina)" as disciplinary rules. They were
retained in the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, adopted in
1983, which succeeded the Model Code and provide the basis of the
present Rules."
Since 1961 every state has enacted some statutory form of a professional service corporation, and no state prohibits the use of professional
corporations by lawyers."
South Carolina enacted its Professional
Association Act in 1962,38 replacing it with the South Carolina Professional Corporation Supplement 9 in 1988.
State legislatures, such as South Carolina's, presumably approve of the
use of professional corporations for law practice because they left the
professional corporation statutes unamended after their use by lawyers
became common. Although statutory prohibitions on the corporate practice

lawyer shall not aid a non-lawyer in the unauthorized practice of law."); DR 3-103(A)
(lawyer shall not form a law partnership with a non-lawyer); DR 5-107(B), (C)(3) (lawyer
must not let person other than client affect the lawyer's judgment); DR 6-102(A) (lawyer
shall not limit his liability to his client).
35. S.C. Sup. CT. R. 32 (Law. Co-op. 1976) (adopted Mar. 1, 1973) (superseded).
36. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1992); see S.C. APP. CT. R. 407, Rules

1.8, 5.4 (Law. Co-op. 1976). Several'specific provisions of these Rules are discussed below
in the text accompanying note 91-99.
37. See Johnson, supra note 1, at 92 ("Today, every state has statutory authorization for
the incorporation of professional associations, including law firms."); Keatinge & Coleman,
supra note 26, at 28 (chart showing which states have legalized LLCs, LLPs, and PCs for
use by attorneys); Rosencrantz, supra note 2, at 357 ("Currently, attorneys may incorporate
as PCs in all fifty states."). A possible exception is Kentucky, whose court rejected a
proposed practice rule authorizing law practice in the professional corporation format
doubting "'that lawyers can so limit their liability."'Allan G. Donn, Limited Liability Entities
for Law Firms, in THE BEST ENTITY FOR DOING THE DEAL 1996, at 237, 240 (PLI Corp.

Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. B4-7143, 1996) (quoting Order Amending
Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rules of the Supreme Court, No. 951(Ky. Sept. 22, 1995)).
Some states have adopted statutes directed to particular professions. E.g., COLO. REV.
STAT. §§ 12-2-101 to -131 (1997) (accountants); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12:801-:858 (West
1994) (lawyers); S.D. CODIFIED LAws §§ 47-11-1 to -13B-18 (Michie 1991) (licensed
physicians, chiropractors, dentists, veterinarians, lawyers, and accountants).
38. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-19-101 S.C. Rep. cmt. (Law. Co-op. 1990).
39. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 33-19-101 to -700 (Law. Co-op. 1990 & Supp. 1997).
Organization of a professional association under the South Carolina Professional Corporation
Supplement requires formation under the South Carolina Business Corporation Act of 1988,
S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 33-1-101 to -20-105 (Law. Co-op. 1990 & Supp. 1997), and an election
of the South Carolina Statutory Close Corporation Supplement, S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 33-18101 to -500 (Law. Co-op. 1990 & Supp. 1997). See S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-19-102 (Law. Coop 1990). The special provisions of the South Carolina Professional Corporation Supplement
and the Close Corporation Supplement control over inconsistent provisions of the Business
Corporation Act. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 33-18-102(a)-(b), 33-19-102 (Law. Co-op. 1990).
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40
of law remain on the books in many states, including South Carolina,
the passage of professional corporation statutes, their recognition by the
Rules of Professional Conduct, and their wide use by lawyers can
reasonably be viewed as a partial legislative overruling of the general
statutory prohibition on the corporate practice of law.

B. LLCs and LLPs: Structurally, No Less Suitable for Lawyers
As a matter of structure, LLCs and LLPs are no less suitable for the
practice of law than professional corporations. Acceptance of the LLC and
LLP as law practice formats was not immediate; indeed, a Texas prohibition against lawyers organizing as LLCs4 ' may have stimulated the
invention of the LLP format. 42 Although not as ubiquitous as the professional corporation, the LLC and LLP formats now enjoy wide acceptance
as formats for law practice.43
1. The Limited Liability Partnership
In South Carolina,' as elsewhere,45 LLPs are general partnerships
that register with a state agency and comply with other requirements,46
thus qualifying their general partners for limited tort liability."4

40. S. C. CODE ANN. § 40-5-320 (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1997).
41. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n, §§ 1.01-9.02 (West 1997). Texas lawyers
are now permitted to organize as LLCs. TEXAs ETHIcs Op. 486 (1994). However, the limited
liability entity of choice in Texas remains the LLP, due in large part to a franchise tax
imposed on LLCs but not LLPs. See TEx. TAx CODE ANN. § 171.001(a)(2) (West 1992).
42. For an overview of the savings and loan debacle in Texas that started lawyers
clamoring for a limited liability entity, see Robert W. Hamilton, RegisteredLimited Liability
Partnerships:Present at the Birth (Nearly), 66 U. COLO. L. REv. 1065 (1995).
43. Such acceptance is not universal. See infra PartIII. C.
44. The LLP format was created by amending the South Carolina General Partnership
Act. See supra note 5.
45. See generally Martin I. Lubaroff, Registered Limited Liability Partnerships-The
Next Wave, in 8 No.5 INSIGHTS 23 (1994) (chronicling which jurisdictions have enacted LLP
legislation and predicting that many other jurisdictions will soon follow).
46. In South Carolina, LLP status is granted to general partnerships upon registration
with the Secretary of State and maintenance of professional liability insurance in the amount
of $100,000 in excess of any deductible. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 33-41-1110(A), (D), -1 130(A)
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997). The LLP must renew its registration annually. § 33-41-1110(E).
47. General partners in South Carolina LLPs are not insulated from liability for any
partnership obligation other than as follows:
(A) Except as provided by subsection (3), all partners are liable
jointly and severally for everything chargeable to the partnership.
(B) Subject to subsections (C) and (D), a partner in a registered
limited liability partnership is not liable directly or indirectly, including
by way of indemnification, contribution, or otherwise, for debts, obliga-
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As general partnerships, LLPs are subject to the usual laws governing
partnerships4 8 and, when used in law practice, to the Rules of Professional
Conduct applicable to general partnerships. 49 Furthermore, many LLP
statutes, including the amendments creating LLPs in South Carolina,
include professional-use provisions resembling, and presumably patterned
after, Model Rule 5.4.so With a view towards lawyer regulation, the only
difference between LLPs and the traditional model of law practice is the
question of the members' vicarious malpractice liability. Avoiding such
liability is the primary, perhaps only, reason for inventing the LLP in the

tions, and liabilities chargeable to the partnership arising from negligence, wrongful acts, or misconduct committed while the partnership is
a registered limited liability partnership and in the course of the
partnership business by another partner or an employee, agent, or representative of the partnership.
(C) Subsection (B) shall not affect the liability of a partner in a
registered limited liability partnership for his own negligence, wrongful
acts, or misconduct, or that of a person under his direct supervision and
control.
(D) Each individual who renders professional services on behalf
of a registered limited liability partnership is liable for a negligent or
wrongful act or omission in which he personally participates to the same
extent as if he rendered the services as a sole practitioner. A partner of
a registered limited liability partnership which renders professional
services, as defined in Section 33-19-103(7), is not liable for the
negligence, wrongful acts, misconduct, or omissions of other partners,
agents, or employees of the registered limited liability partnership unless
he is at fault in appointing, supervising, or cooperating with them.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-41-370 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997). These provisions purport to
insulate partners in an LLP from vicarious malpractice liability to the extent that such
liability sounds in tort but quare whether they effectively insulate LLP partners from
malpractice actions phrased as contract actions or breaches of trust.
48. In South Carolina, the relevant law is the Uniform Partnership Act, S.C. CODE ANN.
§§ 33-41-10 to -1220 (Law. Co-op. 1990 & Supp. 1997).
49. For example, a partner is responsible for ensuring that all lawyers in the firm
conform to and abide by the Rules of Professional Conduct, and may be held liable for
another lawyer's violation thereof. MODEL RULES OF PRoFEssIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.1
(1992). A partner's responsibilities extend to the acts of nonlawyer employees as well. Id.
Rule 5.3. In addition, "[a] lawyer shall not form a partnership with a nonlawyer if any of the
activities of the partnership consist of the practice of law." Id. Rule 5.4(b). A lawyer shall
not enter into a partnership which includes a covenant not to compete upon termination of
the partnership. Id. Rule 5.6.
50. See Lubaroff, supra note 45, at 24-25 (discussing this proposition generally and the
Delaware LLP statute in particular). For the South Carolina amendments, see supra note 5.
In South Carolina, such provisions were copied from the S. C. Professional Corporation
Supplement. Compare S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-41-370 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997) (discussing
the liability of LLP partners), with S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-19-340 (Law. Co-op. 1990)
(discussing the liability of employees of professional corporations). In light of the status of
LLPs as general partnerships, such provisions may actually be surplusage.
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first place.5'
Taken as a whole, then, the LLP more closely resembles traditional law
practice formats than does the professional corporation. If professional
corporations are appropriate for law practice, LLPs certainly are. Significantly, in a recent Formal Opinion, the American Bar Association Standing
Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility blessed the practice
of law in the LLP format. 2 The Committee addressed LLPs in the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct 1.8(h)53 and 5.4.54
2. The Limited Liability Company
One can view the LLP as a traditional practice format with a modem
wrinkle. By contrast, in this country the LLC is a true innovation.
Modeled after the GmbH, the German small-business format widely copied
around the world,55 the LLC combines a true corporate veil' 6 with the

51. See Lubaroff, supra note 45, at 23.
52. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 96-401 (1996).
53. As to Rule 1.8(h), restricting lawyers' prospective limitation of liability to clients,
the Committee observed that the LLP format does not limit a lawyer's own liability to
clients. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 96-401 (1996).
In any event, the Committee observed, the liability limitation of the format derives from state
law, not from an agreement between lawyer and client, which is the focus of Rule 1.8(h).
Id.
54. As to Rule 5.4, the Committee determined that lawyers practicing in LLPs must
comply with ABA Formal Opinion No. 303 relating to practice as professional corporations.
Id. Each lawyer must remain personally responsible to clients. Id. Lawyers in LLPs must
make the limited liability nature of the enterprise known to clients by, for example, including
"LLP" in the firm name. Id. The LLP must not include any non-lawyer members. Id.
Supervisory lawyers remain obligated under Rules 5.1(b) and 5.3(b) to 'make reasonable
efforts to ensure' that lawyers and nonlawyers under their supervision comply with their
ethical responsibilities. Id.
55. See, e.g., Ingrid L. Lenhardt, The Corporate and Tax Advantages of a Limited
Liability Company: A German Perspective, 64 U. CiN. L. Rlv. 551, 552 (1996); Hugh T.
Scogin, Jr., Withdrawel and Expulsion in Germany: A Comparative Perspective on the
"Close Corporation Problem," 15 MICH. J. INT'L L. 127, 130-31 (1993).
56. The LLC's limitation of liability may be broader than the version found in the
Business Corporation Act. Compare S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-44-303 (Law. Co-op. Supp.
1997) with § 33-6-220 (Law. Co-op. 1990) (the former, applying to LLCs, makes piercing
the veil more difficult by explicitly excluding corporate formalities from the piercing
analysis).
Differing from the LLP, whose partners are protected from only certain kinds of tort
liability, the drafters of the 1996 LLC Act, S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 33-44-101 to -1207 (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1997), intended that the LLC limitation on liability be as comprehensive as the
corporate limitation. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-41-370 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997). Whether
the partnership-like LLC will receive the same treatment as corporations in this respect is
an open question. See generally Debra L. Thill, Comment, The Inherent Powers Doctrine
and Regulation of the Practice ofLaw: Will Minnesota Attorneys Practicingin Professional
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potential for true partnership taxation 7 to a degree of completeness
unthought of in this country prior to 1977.58
In addition to limited liability and tax advantages, LLCs offer almost
unlimited flexibility in governance. Unlike business corporations, whose
governance is mandated in detail by statute, LLCs are governed primarily
by the provisions of an agreement among their owners, usually called an
"operating agreement."' 9 Members may customize LLC governance to
provide a degree of flexibility highly agreeable to investors willing to do
without the protections and familiarity of the business corporation act.
Finally, there are no limits on the ownership of LLCs, in contrast to the
limitations on ownership of Subchapter S corporations.'
Many LLC statutes follow the example of the professional corporation
statutes and include professional-use provisions parallelling Model Rules
of Professional Conduct Rule 5.4 and preserving the common-law
relationship characteristics of privilege and confidentiality. 6 Structurally,
LLC statutes protect clients just as well as the professional corporation and

Corporations or Limited Liability Companies Be Denied the Benefit of Statutory Liability
Shields?, 20 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 1143, 1172 (1994).
Although little case law exists, "most commentators assume that the [corporate veil]
doctrine applies to limited liability companies." Ditty v. Checkrite, Ltd., 973 F. Supp. 1320,
1335 (D. Utah 1997).
57. S-corporation taxation is not true partnership taxation. Susan Kalinka, Shareholder

Guarantees and Subchapter S Basis: Investment in the Corporation,64 TEMP. L. REv. 659,
659-60 (1991). In 1988, the IRS ruled that a Wyoming LLC qualified for partnership tax
treatment. Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360. This prompted many states to promulgate LLC
legislation even though the IRS continued to evaluate LLC taxation on a case-by-case basis.
See Rev. Rul. 93-38, 1993-1 C.B. 233 (allowing partnership taxation of one Delaware LLC
but denying it to another); Rev. Rul. 93-6, 1993-1. C.B. 229 (allowing partnership taxation
of a Colorado LLC); Rev. Rul. 93-5, 1993-1 C.B. 227 (allowing partnership taxation of
Virginia LLC).
58. The Wyoming legislature enacted the first LLC statute in 1977. Wyoming Limited
Liability Company Act, Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-15-101 to -144 (Michie 1997). No further
statutes were enacted until Florida's in 1983. Florida Limited Liability Company Act, FLA.
STAT. ANN. §§ 608.401-.471 (West 1993 & Supp. 1998). At this point, the race was on.
See generally Rosencrantz, supra note 2, at 355-56 (noting the order in which states enacted
LLC statutes).
59. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-44-103 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997).
60. See I.R.C. § 1361(b)(1) (Supp. 1997) (generally limiting ownership to 75 natural
persons who are citizens of the United States).
61. E.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 23-18-3-4 (Michie 1995); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
450.4905 (West Supp. 1997); Miss. CODE ANN. § 79-29-920 (1996). South Carolina
included provisions preserving privilege and confidentiality in the 1994 Act but, inexplicably, did not include such provisions in the 1996 Act. Compare S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-43304(B)-(C) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997) (repealed effective Jan. 1, 2001), (contemplates
liability for rendering professional services) with § 33-44-303 (omits mention of professional
services and concomitant liability therefor).
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LLP statutes, even though LLCs are arguably not contemplated directly by
Rule 5.4.62

The LLC and LLP formats are not inherently less appropriate for use
by lawyers than professional corporations, especially when provisions are
included that parallel Rule 5.4 and preserve common-law client protections
of privilege and confidentiality. Accordingly, the issues addressed in the
balance of this paper will apply to all three limited-liability formats.
C. Limitation of Liability
As noted above, professional corporations are widely accepted; LLCs
and LLPs less so, but their acceptance is increasing. The overall popularity
of limited liability formats for professionals63 should not, however, be
confused with a uniform endorsement of the legislative limitation of
vicarious malpractice liability. Many states, using a variety of approaches,
avoid giving effect, or full effect, to such limitations.' 4 Rhode Island, for
example, bars the use of LLCs by professionals, 65 appearing to be the
only state to do so.' A number of states which do permit lawyers to
organize in limited liability formats do not give effect, or full effect, to the

62. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 5.4 (1992) refers to "a professional
corporation or association," and does not refer to LLCs. However, LLCs are a species of
unincorporated association. On the other hand, when Rule 5.4 was adopted, unincorporated
associations with limited liability did not exist, so that LLC-type associations could not have
been contemplated even by use of the term "association."
63. By a recent count, 22 states expressly permitted lawyers to practice as LLCs, while,
in many other states (including the 1994 South Carolina LLC Act, S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-43102(N) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997) (repealed effective Jan. 1, 2001)), lawyers implicitly fall
within the statutory definition of "professionals." Christensen and Bertschi, supra note 19,
at 696-97. The number is undoubtedly greater today. See generally Keatinge & Coleman,
supra note 26, at 28 (noting that California, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Oregon, Rhode

Island, and Vermont prohibit law practice in the LLC format; Nevada, West Virginia, and
Wisconsin may not; Arkansas, Arizona, Delaware, Illinois, North Dakota, Nevada, Vermont,
West Virginia, and Wyoming do not allow law practice in the LLP format). South
Carolina's 1996 LLC Act does not expressly contemplate use by professionals. S.C. CODE
ANN. §§ 33-44-101 to -1207 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997).
64. The Official Comment to S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-44-112 observes that although an
LLC can be organized for any lawful purpose, "many states impose restrictions on activities
in which a limited liability company may engage. For example, the practice of certain
professionals is often subject to special conditions." S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-44-112 cmt.
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997). Allan G. Donn's article in the April-May 1996 PLI Corporate
Law and Practice Course Handbook breaks down acceptance of professional corporations,
LLCs, and LLPs by state. Donn, supra note 37, at 240.
65. RI. GEN. LAWS § 7-16-3 (1992 & Supp. 1994) ("Every limited liability company
organized under this chapter has the purpose of engaging in any business which a limited
partnership may carry on, except the provision of professional services .....
66. See Donn, supra note 37, at 246.
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formats' nominal insulation from liability. Delaware,67 Wisconsin,"
Illinois,69 Oregon,70 Kentucky,7 Nebraska,72 and Indiana, 3 for exam-

ple, block limitation of vicarious malpractice liability by statute or court
rule. Colorado Rule of Civil Procedure 265 permits incorporated law firms
to limit lawyer liability by a provision in their articles of incorporation, on
condition that the corporation is insured up to minimum standards.74

California state bar rules subject professional corporation shareholder
malpractice liability to amount minimums and insurance setoff, but, up to
such minimums, liability among shareholders is joint and several.75 A
Nebraska state bar ethics opinion prohibits lawyers from organizing as
LLCs, although Nebraska's LLC statute contemplates use by professionals. 76 The Texas77 and District of Columbia 78 LLP statutes extend or

67. DEL. SUP. CT. R. 67(h)(ii).
68. Wisconsin law previously provided that liability arising out of the provision of
professional services is joint and several among shareholders in professional corporations.
See Melby v. O'Melia, 286 N.W.2d 373, 374 (Wis. Ct. App. 1979). The statute has been
amended to limit shareholders' personal liability to their own misconduct and the misconduct
of persons under their actual supervision and control. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.1915 (West
Supp. 1997),
69. ILL. Sup. CT. R. 721(d); see John Richards, Note, Illinois Professional Service
Firms and the Limited Liability Partnership: Extending the Privilege to Illinois Law Firms,
8 DEPAuL Bus. L.J. 281, 303-04 (1996).
70. Oregon recently lifted its ban on law practice in the LLC format, but mandates joint
and several liability for the torts of all members of limited liability law practices. OR. Rv.
STAT. § 58.185(2)(c) (1988 & Supp. 1996) (professional corporations); § 63.074(2) (Supp.
1996) (LLCs); § 68.270(6) (1988 & Supp. 1996) (LLPs).
71. The Kentucky LLC Act expressly includes attorneys as a profession for which the
LLC format is available, but the Kentucky Supreme Court recently rejected a proposed rule
which would have given the court's blessing to the legislative enactment. See John T.
Ballantine & Thomas E. Rutledge, Kentucky Supreme Court Rejects Use of LLCs, LLPs and
PCs by Attorneys, Ky. BENCH & BAR J., Winter 1996, at 21, 29 (citing Order Amending
Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rules of the Supreme Court, No. 951 (Ky. Sept. 22, 1995)).
72. NEB. SUP. CT. R. PROF'L SERV. CORP. RULE I.F.
73. IND. R. ADMISSION & DISCIPLINE OF ATrYs. RULE 27.
74. COLO. R. Civ. P. 265 I.A.4. Rule 265 and Colorado Professional Conduct Rule 5.4,
which expressly forbids lawyers from organizing as LLCs or PAs unless they are in
compliance with Rule 265, are intended to be complementary in regulating attorneys'
eligibility to organize as LLCs, LLPs, and PAs. COLO. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Rule 5.4(d); COLO. R. Civ. P. 265 I.A.4.
75. CAL. STATE BAR LAW CORP. R. IV.B(1); see Beane v. Paulsen, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d
486, 490 (Ct. App. 1993).
76. Neb. State Bar Ass'n Advisory Comm., Ethics Op. 94-1 (1994).
77. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b-3.08(a)(2)(B) (West Supp. 1998) (noting that
"reasonable steps to prevent or cure" the negligence of another partner is an affirmative
defense).
78. D.C. CODE ANN. § 41-146(a)(2) (Supp. 1997) (repealed effective Jan. 1, 1998)
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extended liability to partners who had notice or knowledge of a partner's
malpractice."
A number of states, including South Carolina, subject professional
practice in limited liability formats to rules of the respective professions'
governing bodies.8" While some states, such as Ohio, render all shareholders in law corporations liable for all obligations as if they were
partners,8 1 others respect the statutory grant of limited liability for contract
obligations, 2 but deal separately with limitations on vicarious malpractice
liability. Cases addressing limiting malpractice liability are discussed in
Part III.
II. PRESERVING THE LAWYER-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP

Part I described a transformation of the practice of law from the
traditional, unlimited liability model prohibiting law practice in the
corporate form, to one in which three limited-liability formats are available
to lawyers. The gradual acceptance of this transformation hinged upon
institutional confidence in mechanisms designed to protect the lawyer-client
relationship, 3 and the public perception of the legal profession-if you
will, the lawyer-public relationship.84 This Part addresses those two

(indicating that "written notice or knowledge" of errors or negligence of one partner makes
another partner in an LLP liable).
79. For the most comprehensive breakdown of which the author is aware of as of this
writing, see Donn, supra note 37.
80. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 33-19-103(5)-(6), -110 (Law. Co-op. 1990); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 33-41-1130(A)(2) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997); S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-43-1104 (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1997) (repealed effective Jan. 1, 2001); Johnson, supra note 1, at 98. The
South Carolina 1996 LLC Act does not explicitly provide for use by professionals, although
an Official Comment refers to such use. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-44-112 cmt. (Law. Co-op.
1997).
81. See discussion of South High Development, Ltd. v. Weiner, Lippe & Cromley Co.,
445 N.E.2d 1106 (Ohio 1983), infra note 130-147.
82. E.g., We're Assocs. Co. v. Cohen, Stracher & Bloom, P.C., 480 N.E.2d 357, 360
(N.Y. 1985) ("[T]he shareholders of a [legal] professional corporation cannot be held
personally liable for an ordinary business debt of the corporation.")
83. Cf ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 303 (1961) (allowing attorneys
to practice in the PC form); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal
Op. 96-401 (1996) (allowing attorneys to practice in the LLP form); Rosencrantz, supra note
2, at 354 ("The noncorporate status of the professional was considered necessary to preserve
for clients 'the benefits of a highly confidential relationship based upon personal confidence,
ability, and integrity."' (quoting In re The Florida Bar, 133 So. 2d 554 (Fla. 1961))).
84. See Hanaas v. State, 279 S.C. 592, 596, 310 S.E.2d 440, 443 (Ct. App. 1983)
("[Tihe practice of law is a profession-not a business or skilled trade.... mhe chief end
of a profession is public service." (quoting In re Jacobson, 240 S.C. 436, 448, 126 S.E.2d
346, 353 (1962))); Rosencrantz, supra note 2, at 354 ("Some states feared that professionals,
if allowed to incorporate, would emphasize the business aspect of their professions rather
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relationships and their function in lawyer regulation, concluding that the
limitation of vicarious malpractice liability by statute omits a significant
component of lawyer regulation.
The lawyer-client relationship and its traditional incidents are based on
agency. s5 In particular, the relationship relies upon the agent's duty of
loyalty and that duty's subset, the duty of exclusivity with respect to the
subject matter of the agency. 6 The values served by these duties render
anathema the intervention in the relationship of any "lay intermediary.""
Indeed, the traditional prohibition on the corporate practice of law has been
described in these terms.88
Thus, the preservation of the lawyer-client relationship depends upon
mechanisms tending to eliminate lawyer responsiveness to any goal or
master other than the advancement of client interests. 9 This objective can
be described as an attempt to minimize the inevitable divergence between
the interests of principal and agent." Such divergence is particularly
pernicious in law, where the agent is so substantially the advantaged party.
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct are designed in large part to

preserve the lawyer-client relationship 9 and to discourage any motivation
for action by the lawyer other than in furtherance of the client's best
interest.9' The reformation of the Rules to contemplate corporate law
practice required that these two objectives be dealt with principally in
Rules 5.4 and 1.8.
By its terms, Rule 5.4 is directed toward preservation of the lawyer's

than the service aspect, and clients would suffer as a result.").
85. See, e.g., Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy v. Boon, 13 F.3d 537, 543 (2d Cir.
1994) (stating that attorneys have a "unique position of trust and confidence"); In re
Cooperman, 633 N.E.2d 1069, 1071 (N.Y. 1994) (stating that a client'shiring of an attorney
creates a "unique fiduciary reliance.., imbued with ultimate trust and confidence").
86. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 387, 394 (1958) (explaining that an
agent must only act to benefit a principal).
87. See, e.g., State ex rel. Daniel v. Wells, 191 S.C. 468, 480, 5 S.E. 2d 181, 186 (1939)
(explaining that a layman cannot appear in court to represent a corporation).
88. See Richards, supra note 69, at 303 (citing In re Co-operative Law Co., 92 N.E. 15,
16 (N.Y. 1910) (creating profits for shareholders would interfere with the lawyer-client
relationship)).
89. See, e.g, In re Education Law Ctr., Inc., 429 A.2d 1051, 1055 (N.J. 1981)
(explaining that an attorney must be completely loyal to the client).
90. Cf.Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91
YALE L.J. 698, 700-03 (1982) (explaining the function of a fiduciary's duties).
91. See In re Wallace, 574 So. 2d 348, 351 (La. 1991) ("These rules are designed to
give the client the right to control and direct the assertion and protection of his legal rights
as fully as practicable, and to encourage and require an attorney to act with loyalty and in
the best interest of his client.").
92. See MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.4 cmt. (1992).
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"professional independence of judgment."'93 Rule 5.4 is an expression of
the lawyer's duty of loyalty with the emphasis falling strongly upon the
exclusivity aspect of this duty. To this end, lawyers may not enter into
partnerships with nonlawyers,94 share legal fees with non-lawyers, except
under prescribed conditions, 95 or practice in the corporate form if any
non-lawyer is an owner, director, or officer or has "the right to direct or
control the [lawyer's] professional judgment."96 These rules promote the
agency value of exclusivity and encourage congruence of the interests of
lawyer and client. Other than the client, the only persons permitted to
influence the representation are other lawyers presumably subject to the
same rules, professional discipline, and other incidents of lawyer regulation.
Rule 1.8(h) addresses the liability side of the agency relationship97
with its deterrent, punitive, and compensatory functions.98 The Rule is
hardly comprehensive; it constrains only agreements limiting the lawyer's
malpractice liability to clients. 9 Otherwise, the Rules leave open the
issue of liability, presumably leaving it to be dealt with in terms of
malpractice. As suggested below, the resulting ambiguity--or perhaps

93. Id.
94. Id. Rule 5.4(b).
95. Id. Rule 5.4(a). The rule lists the conditions as follows:
(1) [A]n agreement by a lawyer with the lawyer's firm, partner, or

associate may provide for the payment of money, over a reasonable
period of time after the lawyer's death, to the lawyer's estate or to one
or more specified persons;
(2) a lawyer who purchases the practice of a deceased, disabled, or
disappeared lawyer may ...pay to the estate or other representative of
that lawyer the agreed-upon purchase price; and
(3) a lawyer or law firm may include nonlawyer employees in a
compensation or retirement plan, even though the plan is based in whole
or inpart on a profit-sharing arrangement.
Id.
96. Id. Rule 5.4(d).
97. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.8(h) (1992); cf.MODEL CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONsmiLrry EC 6-6 (1980) ("A lawyer who handles the affairs of his
client properly has no need to attempt to limit his liability for his professional activities and
one who does not handle the affairs of his client properly should not be permitted to do
so.").
98. In the view of some authorities, the spirit of Rule 1.8 is violated by limiting
lawyers' liability. See, e.g., ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal
Op. 96-401 (1996) (concluding that organizing in a manner limiting vicarious malpractice
liability does engage Rule 1.8(h) but does not violate it, because the Rule prohibits lawyers
from prospectively limiting malpractice liability, but not legislatures); Richards, supra note
69, at 305-06 (concluding that allowing attorneys to organize as LLPs and PCs will not
violate Rule 1.8 because at most it would limit vicarious liability, not the attorneys' direct
liability to their clients).
99. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.8(h).
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even ambivalence-is significant.
The new limited-liability statutes self-consciously follow the Rules by
incorporating traditional elements of the lawyer-client relationship, using
language similar to that of the Rules.' 0 For example, the S. C. Professional Corporation Supplement limits a professional corporation's business
purpose to the practice of a single profession, 01 requires the corporation
to render professional services only through individuals appropriately
professionally licensed and in good standing,"° limits the number of nonprofessionals serving as officers or directors, 03 and preserves client
privilege and confidentiality.'"
Modem limited-liability statutes also directly address the potential
personal liability of shareholder-employees, going well beyond the Rules
in this respect. For example, the S. C. Professional Corporation Supplement provides that shareholder-employees of professional corporations are
personally liable for their own professional liabilities, in the usual way.'
Being a jural person, the limited liability enterprise itself is subject
vicariously to all liabilities of the business, including the professional
liabilities of its owners. 0 6
Like the exclusivity rules already discussed, these liability provisions
are informed by familiar rules of agency. However, they do not extend to
the partnership characteristic of joint and several liability of all principals
of the enterprise." 7 Thus, the corporate veil provision of the S. C.
100. Compare, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 33-19-110 to -140 (Law. Co-op. 1990)
(structural limitations on professional corporations), and §§ 33-19-320 to -340 (confidentiality, privilege, and liability in professional corporations), with Rule 5.4 (conditions to
corporate practice of law).
101. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-19-110(a) (Law Co-op. 1990).
102. S. C. CODE ANN. § 33-19-130(a) (Law Co-op. 1990).
103. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-19-300 (Law. Co-op. 1990) (providing that not less than half
the directors of a professional corporation and all the officers except the secretary and
treasurer, if any, must be licensed professionals).
104. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 33-19-320 to -330 (Law. Co-op. 1990) (providing that the
duties of privilege and confidentiality run to the corporation, as well as to the individual
practitioner-employee).
105. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-19-340(a) (Law. Co-op. 1990) ("Each individual who
renders professional services as an employee of a ... professional corporation is liable for
a negligent or wrongful act or omission in which he personally participates to the same
extent as if he rendered the services as a sole practitioner."). The Official Comment to this
code section observes that courts have given effect to similarly-worded provisions. See id.
S.C. Rpt. cmt. (citing Grayson v. Jones, 710 P.2d 76 (Nev. 1985) (per curiam) and Birt v.
Saint Mar) Mercy Hosp. of Gary, Inc., 370 N.E.2d 379 (Ind. Ct. App. 1977)). Without
discussion, Grayson enforces the statutory limitation of liability in favor of shareholders in
a lav corporation. Grayson, 710 P.2d at 77. Birt, a medical malpractice case, explicitly
provides that its reasoning and holding do not apply to legal malpractice. Birt, 370 N.E.2d
at 384-85.
106. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-19-340(b)-(c) (Law. Co-op. 1990).
107. § 33-19-340. Indeed, one effect of the amendments to the South Carolina Uniform
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol49/iss3/4
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Professional Corporation Supplement purports to protect shareholderemployees from personal liability for the malpractice of colleagues except
those whom they appoint or supervise or with whom they cooperate. 08
All shareholder-employees are purportedly shielded from contract liabilities
of the business unless they expose themselves to liability in some
9
way."1
In short, the Rules and statutes incorporate agency-based mechanisms
for preservation of almost all of the traditional incidents of the lawyerclient relationship. The one traditional incident which is omitted is
personal vicarious malpractice liability. Therefore, the essential question
posed is whether vicarious malpractice liability is important to the lawyerclient relationship, or whether one can preserve the relationship satisfactorily without it.
The absence of vicarious malpractice liability from the Rules of
Professional Conduct is not conclusive of its marginality in terms of lawyer
regulation. The contrary is true for two reasons. One reason relates to the
function of malpractice in lawyer regulation, and the other lies within the
Rules themselves.
First, malpractice liability, including vicarious
malpractice liability, is a distinct sector of lawyer regulation." 0 With its
distinctive remedial aspect, vicarious malpractice liability lies perhaps
closer to the heart of the lawyer-client relationship than the disciplinary
sector based on the Rules. Legislative limitation of lawyers' malpractice
liability is a direct exercise in regulation of the practice of law. Malpractice as a sector of lawyer regulation does not rely for potency on statutes
or court rules; it is an aspect of lawyer regulation maintained by the courts
pursuant to their powers and responsibilities to regulate law practice."'
The Rules of Professional Conduct themselves address one distinct

Partnership Act creating the LLP format is to eliminate such liability-at least for torts. See
S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-41-370 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997).

108. S.C. CODE

ANN.

§ 33-19-340(a) (Law. Co-op. 1990).

109. See § 33-19-340(b) ("[The personal liability of a shareholder of a domestic or
foreign professional corporation is no greater in any respect than the liability of a
shareholder of a corporation incorporated under the South Carolina Business Corporation
AcL"). The Business Corporation Act provides that shareholders are not liable for corporate
obligations by virtue of being shareholders, but may become liable for corporate obligations
"by reason of his own acts or conduct." S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-6-220(b) (Law. Co-op. 1990).
110. See Birt v. St. Mary Mercy Hosp. of Gary, Inc., 370 N.E.2d 379, 385 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1977) (characterizing the Indiana Supreme Court's order rendering shareholders in law
firms organized as professional corporations jointly and severally liable for one another's
malpractice as an exercise of "constitutional authority to promulgate administrative
regulation of the practice of law"). See generally David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate
Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 799 (1992) (discussing various enforcement systems in the
regulation of lawyer conduct).
11. See discussion infra Part III.
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sector of lawyer regulation, the disciplinary sector. Malpractice is not
within their ambit. Their parameters do not therefore define the applicability of malpractice. The absence of malpractice from the Rules does not
mean that it has disappeared from lawyer regulation. The Rules are not
comprehensive in their account of lawyer regulation, and neither are
statutes imitating the Rules.
Moreover, the Rules themselves emphasize the duty of loyalty and
exclusivity, avoidance of the intervention of the lay intermediary, and
minimization of the divergence of interests between lawyer and client.
However, elimination of vicarious liability in a corporate setting decreases
the interest of lawyers in those cases in which they are not involved. Such
lawyers' interest in profits from such cases will not decrease but will
become concomitantly more important. Internal monitoring of the client's
interest will diminish-indeed, is discouraged by statues such as South
Carolina's-but monitoring of the active lawyer's fee collections will
not." 2 The result is a class of passive lawyers within the firm, interested
in fee collections but purposefully disinterested in the client's interests.
These lawyers will closely resemble passive investors or lay intermediar-

ies." 3 The interests of such lawyers having diverged from those of the
active lawyer, the active lawyer, the active lawyer's duties to the passive
lawyers will encourage the active lawyer's interests to diverge from those
of the client. In short, deleting vicarious malpractice liability creates a
mechanism encouraging divergence of the lawyer's interest from that of the
client.
As early as 1962, commentators recognized that statutes permitting
limited liability law practice "perhaps unwittingly, purport to alter the
preexisting manner of professional operations" and require that "professionals modify their traditional scope of responsibility and liability at least to
some degree," leading to "uncertainty and potential demoralization so

112. The following statutes purport to eliminate vicarious malpractice liability except
with respect to those lawyers who appoint, supervise or cooperate with the misfeasant
lawyer: S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-41-370 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997) (LLPs); S.C. CODE ANN.
§§ 33-44-302 to -303 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997) (LLCs); S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-19-340 (Law.
Co-op. 1990) (PAs).
113. See Note, supra note 20.
If a range of professional decisions is reserved to a board of directors,
in derogation of the individual lawyer's traditional responsibility, the
expectations of clients may be defeated and the profession's tradition of
individual self-reliance and integrity impaired.... [This] is unlikely to
improve the public image of the profession, especially since those
operating under the new forms obtain . . .the further and quite
gratuitous benefit of curtailing their traditionally stringent liability
toward clients.

Id. at 789-90.
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entailed for layman and professional alike.""..4 The practical effects of
this departure from traditional practice values are discussed in the next
Part. For present purposes, it is sufficient to conclude that releasing
members of a law practice from all direct, personal connection with a client
encourages a divergence of interests between the active lawyer and that
lawyer's uninvolved, and unexposed, co-owners. This divergence in turn
tends to increase, rather than decrease, the divergence of interests of the
active lawyer and the client. This divergence of the active lawyer's
interests from the interests of the client contradicts the objectives of the
malpractice and disciplinary sectors of lawyer regulation-the latter in
contradiction of the Rules' own orientation.
By contrast, retaining vicarious malpractice liability connects all
lawyers in the practice directly to each client and ensures that the uninvolved lawyers' interests are the same as those of the active lawyer,
minimizing the divergence of interest between them, and therefore between
the active lawyer and the client. As discussed in the next Part, despite
statutes purporting to eliminate it, vicarious malpractice liability can be
retained through the exercise of judicial powers over lawyer regulation.
II. EXPERIENCE IN THE COURTS

Law practices are exposed to a full range of liabilities including
contract obligations, torts, breaches of trust, and malpractice (direct and
vicarious). In the face of statutes purporting to limit lawyers' personal
liability for obligations of their practices, courts have reached a wide
variety of results. This Part takes the position that the varying results are
justified by the extent to which obligations implicate the lawyer-client
relationship. To the extent that client interests are implicated by practice
obligations, the firm and its members, not the client, should bear the threat
and the cost. In addition to financial interests, the interests referred to
include the fact of, and the client's perception of, the congruence of interest
between the practice and the client.
The cases reflect some generally discernable patterns. First, the
overwhelming majority of courts to consider the issue of lawyer liability
has determined that the issue falls within its inherent powers. Legislative
limitation of liability is accordingly treated as an incursion into judicial
power. Having identified an incursion, some courts treat it as ultra vires,
and therefore void. Other courts treat incursions as merely voidable at
their discretion. As is discussed below, the voidable approach makes better
sense. Many states, including South Carolina, have arguably taken the
voidable approach with respect to past legislative incursions.

114. Note, supra note 20, at 793.
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A court adopting the voidable approach, and thereby asserting
discretionary power to invalidate the legislative limitation of liability, must
decide what circumstances justify exercise of this power. The courts
addressing this issue have treated it as turning on the preservation of the
lawyer-client relationship, but the cases do not clearly express what aspects
of the relationship are implicated. This Part concludes that the most urgent
case for court intervention is the divergence of the interests of lawyer and
client-a divergence which is minimized most efficiently by retaining the
threat of vicarious liability for malpractice.
A. Sources and Extent of Court Power
Most state courts addressing the issue of legislative limitation of lawyer
liability recognize the issue as implicating lawyer regulation." 5 State
courts claim paramount powers in this area, finding these powers, most
often, in constitutional provisions. 11 Such constitutional provisions may
be express grants of power over lawyer regulation, "7 or lawyer discipline". which is a subset of lawyer regulation," 9 or they may be characterized as "implied" or "inherent' 0 powers accompanying constitutional designations of court systems. Even a court asserting what might be
thought of as a purely inherent power-a power relating to no express

115. See, e.g., In re The Florida Bar, 133 So. 2d 554, 555 (Fla. 1961); First Bank &
Trust Co. v. Zagoria, 302 S.E.2d 674, 675 (Ga. 1983), overruled in part by Henderson v.
HSI Fin. Servs., Inc., 471 S.E.2d 885 (Ga. 1996); In re Bar Ass'n of Haw., 516 P.2d 1267,
1268 (Haw. 1973); South High Dev., Ltd. v. Weiner, Lippe & Cromley Co., 445 N.E.2d
1106, 1109 (Ohio 1983); American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Clarke & Van Wagner, Inc.,
692 P.2d 61, 66-68 (Okla. Ct. App. 1984); In re Rhode Island Bar Ass'n, 263 A.2d 692, 695
(R.I. 1970).
116. Courts often characterize such powers as "exclusive." See, e.g., Colorado Supreme
Court Grievance Comm. v. District Court, 850 P.2d 150, 152 (Colo. 1993); Eckles v. Atlanta
Tech. Group, Inc., 485 S.E.2d 22, 25 (Ga. 1997); Washington County Dep'tof Human Servs.
v. Rutter, 651 N.E.2d 1360, 1362-63 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995); Lloyd v. Fishinger, 605 A.2d
1193, 1195 (Pa. 1992); see also cases discussed infra Part III.B.
117. E.g., OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 5(B); S.C. CONST. art. V, § 4; UTAH CONST. art.

VIII, § 4.
118. E.g, FLA. CONST. art. V, § 15; OHIO CONsT. art. IV, § 2(B)(1)(g); S.C. CONsT. art.
UTAH CoNsT. art. VIII, § 4.
119. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
120. Some authorities draw a distinction between "implied" powers, those unmentioned
powers necessary to carry out express powers, and "inherent" powers, powers naturally
inhering in courts but deriving from no express grant. See FELIX F. STUMPF, INHERENT
POWERS OF THE COURTS: SWORD AND SHIELD OF THE JUDICIARY 5 (1994). Rather than enter
the dispute, this paper will use the term "inherent" as defined by the South Carolina courts;
that is, any power not expressly granted in the constitution is "inherent." See, e.g., In re
Ferguson, 304 S.C. 216, 218, 403 S.E.2d 628, 630 (1991); State ex rel. McLeod v. Hite, 272
S.C. 303, 305, 251 S.E.2d 746, 747 (1979).

V, § 4;
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constitutional grant, but inhering purely from the court's status as a
court-would probably ultimately find a source for its power in some
constitutional provision.'
In some states, including South Carolina,
statutes also support court powers over lawyer regulation."Z
B. Applications of Court Power
One can sort the decided cases roughly into two categories. The first
category characterizes any incursion by another branch of government as
ultra vires, and therefore void. The second category characterizes
incursions as voidable at the court's discretion." In the jurisprudence of
lawyer regulation, the void/voidable question is not new.'24 Nor is the
question an easy one because constitutional language in many states, taken
literally, could lead to a conclusion that incursions across constitutional
lines are ultra vires, notwithstanding that legislation regulating lawyers is
enforced by the courts of those very states.'25 The conclusion that
legislative incursions are ultra vires and therefore void leads, of course, to

121. See, e.g., Singer Hutner Levine Seeman & Stuart v. Louisiana State Bar Ass'n, 378
So. 2d 423, 426 (La. 1979) (citing constitutional separation of powers clause and then
observing, "[t]his division creates in the judicial branch an inherent power which the
executive and legislative branches cannot abridge"); In re Integration of Bar of Minn., 12
N.W.2d 515, 518 (Minn. 1943) (asserting inherent power flowing from its existence as a
court to unify the state bar, but the court also relied on constitutional provisions); In re
Unification of N.H. Bar, 248 A.2d 709, 711-12 (N.H. 1968) (same).
122. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 1906 (Supp. 1996); D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-2501
(1995); IND. CODE ANN. § 33-2-3-1 (Michie 1992); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 8-1-2 (1997); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 40-5-10 (Law. Co-op. 1986); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-51-19 (1996).
123. See, e.g., Singer Hutner, 378 So. 2d at 426 ("This court will uphold legislative acts
passed in aid of its inherent power, but will strike down statutes which tind to impede or
frustrate its authority.").
124. For example, see the exhaustive exploration in Clark v. Austin, 101 S.W.2d 977
(Mo. 1937) (en banc). Judge Frank's principal opinion, attracting seven justices, took the
view that "any encroachment on judicial power, whether reasonable or unreasonable, violates

the Constitution which provides, in express terms, there shall be no encroachment at all." Id.
at 980-81. Chief Judge Ellison's concurring opinion, on behalf of five justices, argued at
length that "the legislative department may enact laws [regulating aspects of law practice]
if and in so far as such statutes do not destroy the inherent power of the courts." Id. at 986.
125. E.g., Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 376 N.E.2d 810, 822 (Mass. 1978)
(noting that the legislature may promulgate standards of conduct to aid the judicial
department, but rules set down by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts control);
Clark, 101 S.W.2d at 995 (noting that whether a statute regulating the practice of law is
constitutional valid is determined by the courts); Calhoun v. Supreme Court, 399 N.E.2d 559,
565 (Ohio Ct. App. 1978) ("The General Assembly may enact statutes concerning [the
practice of law], but they have been interpreted as aids or guides to the judiciary. Such
statutes are subservient to any rule adopted by the Supreme Court."); see also Paas, supra
note 21, at 383-86.
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only one result, and one which requires no analysis beyond the ultra vires
conclusion.
Despite its facial attractiveness and relative ease of application, the
ultra vires position has weaknesses discussed below. In any event, the
South Carolina courts,' 26 and probably most others, have already taken
1 27
a voidable position in other cases.
Three significant decisions addressing limitation of lawyer liability
have taken the ultra vires view: In re Bar Ass'n of Hawaii, decided
in 1973; First Bank & Trust Co. v. Zagoria,129 a Georgia case decided
in 1983; and the Ohio Supreme Court's decision in South High Development, Ltd. v. Weiner, Lippe & Cromley Co., 13' also decided in 1983.
Each opinion characterizes the issue as one of lawyer regulation, then
asserts the courts' paramount powers, and finally, having identified a
legislative incursion, declares the legislative incursion void.
In Bar Ass'n of Hawaii the Hawaii Supreme Court addressed a state
Bar petition requesting permission for lawyers to organize and practice as
professional corporations. "' Determining that the court and not the
legislature possessed the power to determine the limits of lawyers' liability
arising from the practice of law, the court concluded that "the promulgation
of any rule allowing incorporation shall not be in derogation of the
attorney-client relationship to the detriment of the client... [and] we
reject ... an alteration [of liability rules] because we believe that its
adoption would not provide adequate protection to a client's claims against
a law corporation."'' 2 The court did not cite any authority, concerning the
source of its power, or expand upon the danger posed to clients' claims.
The Ohio Supreme Court extended the ultra vires view to its logical
conclusion in South High, decided in 1983, the same year as Zagoria.

126. See infra text accompanying note 245.

127. Cf Degan v. United States, _ U.S. __, 116 S. Ct. 1777, 1780 (1996) ("In many
instances the inherent powers of the courts may be controlled or overridden by statute or
rule.").
128. 516 P.2d 1267 (Haw. 1973).

129. 302 S.E.2d 674 (Ga. 1983), overruled in part by Henderson v. HSI Fin. Servs.,
Inc., 471 S.E.2d 885 (Ga. 1996).
130. 445 N.E.2d 1106, 1107 (Ohio 1983).
131. Bar Ass'n of Haw., 516 P.2d at 1268.

132. Id. at 1268.
133. The South High court faced a bigger obstacle than the Zagoria court did: The
Ohio Constitution provided shareholders of corporations with the protection of the corporate
veil. OHIO CONST. art. XIII, § 3. Despite this protection, the Ohio Court promulgated the
following bar governance rule making lawyer/shareholders of professional corporations

generally liable for all obligations of the corporation: "'The participation by an individual
as a shareholder of a legal professional association shall be on the condition that such

individual shall, and by such participation does, guarantee the financial responsibility of the
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South High involved a contract claim rather than malpractice liability.'
The court held that all lawyer-shareholders are jointly and severally liable
for all of the practice's obligations as if they were general partners.' 3 5 In
reaching its conclusion the South High court relied on constitutional grants
of disciplinary and rule-making powers over the practice of law.'36 South
High takes the ultra vires view to its farthest extent, rendering every part

of the legislative incursion void, including the purported protection from
individual liability for corporate contractual obligations.
The California Court of Appeal adopted the essential positions of the
'
ultra vires cases and reached an analogous result in Beane v. Paulsen.37
California state bar rules subject professional corporation shareholder
malpractice liability to recovery minimums and insurance setoff."' Up
to those minimums, however, all shareholder/lawyers are jointly and
severally liable for malpractice claims against their corporation, and, with
respect to such liability, have been treated as general partners.' 39 In
Beane, the California Court of Appeal held two former shareholders of a
professional corporation vicariously liable for their co-shareholder's

association for its breach of any duty, whether or not arising from the attorney-client
relationship."' South High, 445 N.E.2d at 1107 (quoting the 1983 version of the Supreme
Court's rules governing the Ohio Bar). This dilemma required the court to distinguish
"private" corporations, organized for profit and owned by passive shareholders, from
professional corporations, owned by shareholders active in the business. The court
concluded that "limited liability is not necessary for [professional corporations]." Id. at
1108. The court did not cite any authority for this proposition. However, the limitation of
the South High holding to legal professional coirporations was emphasized in KMS Energy,
Inc. v. Titmas, 610 N.E.2d 1080 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992), in which a shareholder in a nonlegal
professional corporation was held insulated from personal liability by the professional
corporation statute. Id. at 1081.
134. South High, 445 N.E.2d at 1107.
135. Id.; accord Columbia Real Estate Title Ins. Co. v. Columbia Title Agency, Inc.,
465 N.E.2d 468, 470 (Ohio CL App. 1983) (citing South High, 445 N.E.2d 1106); Reiner v.
Kelley, 457 N.E.2d 946, 952 (Ohio Ct. App. 1983) (citing South High, 445 N.E.2d 1106);
Nelson v. Patrick, 326 S.E.2d 45, 50 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985) ("A professional corporation is
liable to the same extent as if it were a partnership."). But see We're Assocs. Co. v. Cohen,
Stracher & Bloom, P.C., 480 N.E.2d 357, 359 (N.Y. 1985) (protecting individual
shareholders in a professional service corporation from personal liability); Lyon v. Barrett,
445 A.2d 1153, 1158 (N.J. 1982) (holding professional corporation but not individual
attorney shielded from tort liability by Workers' Compensation law.); Schnapp, Hochberg
& Sommers v. Nislow, 431 N.Y.S.2d 324, 326 (N.Y. Sup. CL 1980) (holding dentist/shareholders in professional corporations to be insulated from contract liability).
136. "The supreme court... shall make rules governing the admission to the practice
of law and discipline of persons so admitted." OHIO CoNsT. art. IV, § 5(B).
137. 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 486 (Ct. App. 1993).
138. See CAL. STATE BAR LAW CORP. Rule IV.B(1)(c), B(3).
139. Beane, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 490.
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malpractice. 4 ' Noting that the plaintiff "was not represented by a
partnership but by a professional corporation," the court observed, "[i]t is
not a distinction, however, that affects our analysis of the question of
liability" of the shareholders."' The court analyzed shareholder liability
under general partnership principles, even referring to the corporation as a
partnership. 42 The Beane court refers approvingly to First Bank & Trust
Co. v. Zagoria,43 Reiner v. Kelley,' 4 and Bar Ass'n of Hawaii,145 all
opinions in which the "traditional liability for malpractice to clients" was
determined to be an essential element of the lawyer-client relationship.'46
The policy underlying the California rules and Beane is evident:
Shared liability by all members of a law practice is a significant means of
lawyer regulation that justifies curtailing legislative limitations of liability.
Beane echoes the essential positions taken by South High and BarAss'n of
Hawaii: First, the personal liability of lawyers, especially malpractice
liability, is recognized as a type of lawyer regulation, and therefore falls
within the court's powers. Further, the opinions imply court powers
extending beyond the express scope of the Rules-powers not limited to
disciplinary enforcement of published ethics rules. Most significantly,
these decisions focus upon preservation of the lawyer-client relationship in
order to protect the client. In other words, these opinions take the view
that the limited liability statutes in question, with their mechanisms
parallelling those of the disciplinary rules, do not fully protect clients or
preserve the lawyer-client relationship. These cases extend beyond agency
rules to the partnership characteristic of general vicarious liability, the last
line of defense against the intrusion of a lay intermediary.
South High is of particular interest in that this case involved contract
liability and not malpractice, but nevertheless, the court rested its decision
on constitutional grants of lawyer-regulation powers. This is a clear
indication that the court views lawyer liability, even outside the context of
malpractice, as implicating lawyer regulation.
The Georgia Supreme Court echoed the positions taken by the ultra
vires cases in Zagoria.47 A lawyer/shareholder in a professional corporation, sued for a fellow-shareholder's professional negligence, asserted
statutory protection from personal liability under the Georgia professional

140. Id. at 491.
141. Id. at 490.
142. Id. at 492 (describing "past tortious acts of their partnership").
143. 302 S.E.2d 674 (Ga. 1983).
144. 457 N.E.2d 946, 951 (Ohio Ct. App. 1983) (following the reasoning of South
High).
145. 516 P.2d 1267 (Haw. 1973).
146. Beane, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 491 n.7.
147. Zagoria, 302 S.E.2d at 674.
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corporation act. 48 Characterizing the case "as one which calls for the
exercise of this court's authority to regulate the practice of law,"' 49 the
Georgia Supreme Court concluded that the legislature "cannot constitutionally cross the gulf separating the branches of government by imposing
regulations upon the practice of law.""'5 These assertions represent a
conclusion that vicarious malpractice liability is a matter of lawyer
regulation based on the paramount power of the constitution. They also
express the ultra vires view that legislative limitation of liability is void.
While the rhetoric of Zagoria echoes the ultra vires view, the result in
the case was limited. The holding extended only to the malpractice issue:
"[W]hen a lawyer holds himself out as a member of a law firm the lawyer
will be liable not only for his own professional misdeeds but also for those
of the other members of his firm" as if the firm were a general partnership.'
The court left the balance of the statute, and indeed of the
corporate veil provision, undisturbed.
The Zagoria court explained this result in terms of the lawyer-client
relationship, indicating that the relationship extended to all lawyers in a
practice:
When a client engages the services of a lawyer the client has the
right to expect the fidelity of other members of the firm. It is
inappropriate for the lawyer to be able to play hide-and-seek in the
shadows and folds of the corporate veil and thus escape the
responsibilities of professionalism.' 52
The opinion falls short by not making clear exactly what it is about
vicarious malpractice liability that implicates the lawyer-client relationship
in a fatal way. Of course, under the ultra vires view, once the court finds
lawyer regulation present, no further explanation is necessary. One can
read the above-quoted sentences as no more than an explanation of why the
issue is one of lawyer regulation.
However, Zagoria stands for more. Clear it is not, but the reference
to the "fidelity of the other members of the firm" must go directly to the
prohibition on intervention of lay intermediaries. All members of the
practice must put the interest of the client ahead of their own. Zagoria
correctly characterizes this as an issue of lawyer regulation and, inarticulately perhaps, validates clients' right to be confident in the absence of

148. Id. at 675.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 676.
152. Id. at 675.
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influences not fully responsive to their interests. Because malpractice is an
element of lawyer regulation, the legislature has no power to take it
away.
The weakness of the ultra vires position lies in its fundamental
postulate that constitutional or other grants of power over lawyer regulation
are exclusive, rendering legislatures incapable of enforceable lawmaking in
the area. Such a position is difficult to justify in the face of the judicial
acceptance of lawyers' use of professional corporations, which is nothing
less than a comprehensive legislative prescription for law practice. The
ultra vires position overlooks the substantial crossover between legislative
The traditional statutory ban
and judicial powers in regulating lawyers.'
on the corporate practice of law is only the most obvious example. In
South Carolina the Constitution mandates that the General Assembly and
the courts share the power to make court rules."5
This weakness of the ultra vires position may underlie the Georgia
Supreme Court's brief opinion in Henderson v. HSI Financial Services,
Inc.'5 Henderson overrules Zagoria "to the extent [Zagoria] states that
this court, rather than the legislative enabling act, determines the ability of
lawyers to insulate themselves" from vicarious malpractice liability. 5
Exercising its "regulatory power" to permit lawyers to organize as professional corporations, the Henderson court gave effect to the statutory
limitation of personal vicarious malpractice liability in favor of two
uninvolved lawyer/shareholders. 7 Permitting such limitation of liability, according to the court, would not "leave the public unprotected"
because the professionally negligent lawyer and the professional corporation as an entity would remain liable to the client. 8 The court took
further comfort from approval of the professional corporation format by the
American Bar Association and the incorporation of such approval into the
Model Code of Professional Responsibility, adopted as part of Georgia's

153. See supra text accompanying note 125; see also Wilkins, supra note I10, at 80508 (for example, the legislative creation of the Securities and Exchange Commission and the
Internal Revenue Service, which establishes their own practice rules for lawyers appearing
before them).
154. S.C. CoNsT. art. V, § 4 ("Subject to the statutory law, the Supreme Court shall
make rules governing the practice and procedure" in state courts). But see Rutherford v.
Rutherford, 307 S.C. 199, 204, 414 S.E.2d 157, 160 (1992) ("The legislative authority to
enact legislation governing the practice and procedure in the state courts simply cannot be
read as an unlimited power contrary to other constitutional limitations on that power.").
155. 471 S.E.2d 885 (Ga. 1996).
156. Id. at 886.
157. Id. at 886-87. The opinion reserves judgment on propriety of lawyers practicing
in other limited liability formats. Id. at 887 n.10.
158. Id. at 886.
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bar rules."5 9
Henderson contains no analysis beyond the foregoing conclusory
statements. The case is perhaps best understood for the proposition that
once the court uses its powers of lawyer regulation to recognize a legislated
format for law practice, the format's limitation of vicarious malpractice
liability must be accepted." 6° Henderson is disappointing in at least three
respects. The first is the non sequitur implicit in the preceding paragraph.
It is not obvious that courts abandon their powers of lawyer regulation by
accepting a legislated practice format.' 6' Even more disappointing is the
opinion's failure to recognize or even address any role for malpractice in
lawyer regulation. The court deletes the client's right of redress with its
concomitant regulatory effects, without even acknowledging that it is doing
so. Finally, in the process of displacing Zagoria, a decision which served
as a national benchmark, surely the Henderson court could have indulged
in more analysis. Perhaps no opinion goes as far as Henderson in
illustrating the absence of judicial analysis of the fundamental and critical
issues involved in legislative limitation of lawyer liability. Henderson
illustrates the inherent weakness of the all-or-nothing ultra vires approach.
Constitutional categories subsume the principles in issue; analysis is
foregone. The result in Henderson is abandonment of an aspect of the
lawyer-client relationship, without discussion.
In addition to its functional weakness, the exclusivity inherent in the
ultra vires approach is unnecessary to the courts' protection of their
paramount powers, so long as the courts are alert to the exercise of their
powers when necessary. The heart of the matter is, of course, to determine
when exercise of the power is necessary. While the opinions are inarticulate on this question, as the cases discussed in the following material
illustrate they are uniform in exercising the power when legislation
threatens the attorney-client relationship.
Like the ultra vires cases, the cases taking the voidable approach focus
on the threat to the lawyer-client relationship. The Rhode Island Supreme

159. Id. at 887.

160. Id. at 886 ("Although this court defines whether lawyers may practice their
profession in a partnership, professional corporation, or other group structure, the relevant
statutes govern whether a particular structural form provides its members with exemptions
from personal liability.").
161. Cf Birt v. St. Mary Mercy Hosp. of Gary, Inc., 370 N.E.2d 379, 385 (Ind. CL
App. 1977) (discussing the Indiana Supreme Court's order rendering shareholders in law
firms organized as professional corporations jointly and severally liable for one another's

malpractice despite the statutory grant of limited liability, and observing that the Supreme
Court, in exercising its powers of lawyer regulation, "was not bound ... to the specific
terms of the statute"); State v. Whitener, 225 S.C. 244, 248, 81 S.E.2d 784, 785-86 (1954)
("T]he legislature has no power to take away [by enacting a statutory scheme] powers
specifically granted to this Court by the Constitution.").
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Court's 1970 decision, In re Rhode Island Bar Ass'n,' is the earliest
statement of the voidable view. 3 Petitioned by the Rhode Island Bar
to permit lawyers to organize under the state's professional corporation
statute," the court observed that the statute would limit lawyers' personal, vicarious malpractice liability. 65 However, the court concluded that
the legislature's act in establishing a corporate form for law practice did not
violate constitutional separation of powers or interfere per se with the
court's inherent powers to regulate law practice." The court noted that
mandatory malpractice insurance and the assets the professional corporation
were still available to answer malpractice judgments, postulating that
"clients ... and the members of the public ... will not suffer by reason

of such limited liability." 67 The court also noted its continuing disciplinary powers over lawyers and over the corporations they form. 8 On this
basis, the court concluded that "insofar as the relationship of attorney and
client and of attorney and the general public is concerned, practice in
corporate form will be ... substantially similar to the practice of law as it
presently exists in ... partnerships." 69
The threat to the lawyer-client relationship triggered the ultra vires
courts' exclusive powers of lawyer regulation. Rhode Island Bar also
identifies the lawyer-client relationship as the trigger of its discretionary
powers. In an exercise of its discretion, the court in Rhode Island Bar did
not perceive this detriment to the lawyer-client relationship as fatal to the
pertinent legislation. Insurance will protect the financial interest of the
client, and any ethical issues will fall within the disciplinary powers of the
courts.
Rhode Island Bar is flawed when the court implies that one sector of
lawyer regulation, court discipline, subsumes the field and justifies the
legislative curtailment of the malpractice sector. 7 °
The Minnesota Court of Appeals took a voidable approach more
congruent with a comprehensive view of lawyer regulation in London,
Anderson & Hoeft, Ltd. v. Minnesota Lawyers Mutual Insurance Co.'

162. 263 A.2d 692 (R.I. 1970); accord In re New Hampshire Bar Ass'n, 266 A.2d 853,
854 (N.H. 1970) (positing jurisdiction over the practice of law based on "custom, practice,
judicial decision and statute").
163. Rhode Island Bar, 263 A.2d at 697.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 697.

166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 696.
169. Rhode Island Bar, 263 A.2d at 698.
170. Cf Wilkins, supra note 110, at 803 (discussing who should be responsible for
regulating lawyer misconduct).
171. 530 N.W.2d 576 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995).
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A law firm's malpractice insurer paid a claim and sought to recover the
deductible from a lawyer/shareholder not involved in the activity giving
rise to the claim. 72 The Minnesota Court of Appeals declined to hold
the uninvolved lawyer/shareholder liable, based on the state's professional
corporation statute."
The court explained its exercise of discretion in
a footnote: "Because this contract does not implicate the attorney-client
relationship, we do not find that [the statute limiting liability] ... infringes
upon the constitutional powers reserved for the Minnesota Supreme
Court."' 74 The opinion stresses that "the issue before this court is strictly
contractual in nature,"'' 75 and cites Zagoria, Hawaii Bar and, "but see,"
Rhode Island Bar. The Minnesota court draws its line short of that in
South High, where every practice liability implicated lawyer regulation, and

instead focuses on malpractice as the bulwark of the lawyer-client relationship. The opinion leaves open exactly what interference with the lawyerclient relationship would trigger the court's discretion, or why. Generally
speaking, then, in the "voidable" cases, like the ultra vires ones, the
lawyer-client relationship triggers the exercise of court discretion. None
of the opinions, however, offer much useful guidance as to the nature of
the relationship or when an incursion will trigger court action.
For the most painstaking approach to this issue, we must turn to Birt
v. St. Mary Mercy Hospital of Gary, Inc.,176 a medical malpractice
opinion decided by the Indiana Court of Appeals. Although Birt provides
that its reasoning and holding do not apply to legal malpractice, 77 the
case is of interest because, before giving effect to a statutory limitation of
professional liability, it addresses in detail the effect of limited liability on
the professional-client relationship.7 7 The case is of further interest

172. Id. at 577.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 578 n.2; see also Porlick, Poliquin, Samara, Inc. v. Compton, 683 So. 2d 545
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996), review denied, 695 So. 2d 701 (Fla. 1997) (holding President of
legal corporation not personally liable for corporations debt); Lyon v. Barrett, 445 A.2d

1153, 1158 (N.J. 1982) (holding shareholder of legal corporation not liable as a shareholder
for workers' compensation claim); We're Assocs. Co. v. Cohen, Stracher & Bloom, P.C., 480
N.E.2d 357 (N.Y. 1985) (holding shareholders of professional service corporation not
personally liable for ordinary business debt of corporation); KMS Energy, Inc. v. Titmas,
610 N.E.2d 1080 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992) (holding shareholder of professional corporation not

personally liable for rent owed by corporation).
Presumably the court's constitutional reference was to MiNN. CONST. art. III, § 1, the
separation of powers clause, and art. VI, § 1, which vests the judicial power of the state in

a supreme court.
175. London, Anderson & Hoeft, 530 N.W.2d at 578 n.2.
176. 370 N.E.2d 379 (Ind. CL App. 1977).

177. Id. at 384-85.
178. Id.
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because the Indiana Supreme Court foreclosed a similar outcome in the
context of the legal profession.' 79
According to Birt, the Indiana legislature, in enacting a professionalservice corporation statute, "intended that [the corporation statute] should
not destroy the traditional relationship between a professional and his
patient through the creation of a corporate shield."' 80 Birt considers
whether the loss of vicarious malpractice liability threatens that relationship.'
Without citing authority, the opinion recognizes the existence of
the argument that liability of the negligent physician alone is insufficient
to preserve this relationship.'
Presumably, this argument is a reference
to respondeat superior liability of the corporation itself, based on agency
principles. The opinion posits, however, that "it does not necessarily follow
that the statute imports the vicarious liability of the Uniform Partnership
Act to apply to associating physicians." ' Thus, inferentially, the court
would have imported vicarious liability, by the statutory language, had the
limitation of such liability interfered with the traditional doctor-client
relationship.
Birt identifies and considers four aspects of the traditional relationship:
the patients' expectations that the entire enterprise is engaged on the
patient's behalf; the related expectation that the enterprise, including all of
its principals (rather than the treating physician alone), will be amenable
to satisfaction of a malpractice judgment; the benefits of co-supervision by
professionals having a personal stake in their associates' professional
behavior; and the exclusion of "lay intermediaries" from interference in the
professional-patient relationship.' 84 Again without citation of authority,
Birt dismisses as overstated the "patient['s] expectations that an entire firm
will be engaged in [the patient's] behalf."' 85 "[E]xperience dictates,"
according to the opinion, "that the physician-patient relationship is
generally intensely personal, rather than collective."' 86 Concern over
collection of damage awards, too, is deemed "overstated," in light of the
treating physician's personal liability, corporate liability, and the availabili-

179. Id.
180. Id. at 383.
181. Id.
182. Birt, 370 N.E.2d at 383 ("It has been argued that [the statute] must be construed
to preserve more than the personal liability of a corporate employee for his own negligent
tort existing under general corporations law.").
183. Id.
184. Id. at 383-84; cf Lawrence, supra note 10, at 210 (to similar effect, especially the
conflicting duties of lawyers in corporate settings). Similar arguments are made in favor of
retaining vicarious malpractice liability in the practice of law.
185. Birt, 370 N.E.2d at 383.
186. Id.
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ty of insurance." 7 As to co-supervision by colleagues, Birt asserts that
professional and ethical administrative supervision is adequate."'
Of the four characteristics of the doctor-client relationship, Birt
considers only the fourth seriously: the possibility of intervention of a "lay
intermediary."' 8 9 This possibility was the reason, according to Birt, that
"physicians and other professionals" traditionally were limited to practice
in partnerships."9 Vicarious liability accompanied the partnership format
as an expression of the aggregate theory of partnership and its resulting
special application of agency rules.'
The opinion infers, however, that
vicarious liability was an effect, rather than a cause, of the partnership
requirement; after all, non-professional partnerships were also subject to
general vicarious liability. 92 Birt concludes that vicarious liability
among partners was not a special rule designed to control professional
client relationships. 93 On the facts before it, the Birt court decided that
the statute in question did not sufficiently threaten the interposition of a lay
intermediary in the physician-patient relationship to warrant setting aside
the statutory grant of limited liability. "9
Birt is limited to the physician-client relationship.'
As to lawyers,
the opinion discusses an order of the Indiana Supreme Court, providing in
relevant part, "'Incorporation by two or more lawyers ...

shall not

modify ... the liability of each for all.., as existed in a partnership for
the practice of law."" 96 According to Birt, the Indiana Supreme Court
promulgated this rule under its constitutional authority to administer the
practice of law, and was informed by "the legal profession's unwavering
commitment to the interests of the client in regulating the practice of
law."'97 Birt clearly distinguishes the legal profession from not only
commercial enterprises, but also other professions. As far as the practice
of law is concerned, Birt undercuts the conclusion that joint and several
liability in a partnership was an historical coincidence rather than a

187. Id.
188. Id. at 384.
189. Id.

190. Id.
191. Birt, 370 N.E.2d at 384.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 385.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 384 (quoting the appendix to the GENERAL PROF'L CORP. ACT, IND. CODE
§ 23-1-13-1 to -12 (1971) (repealed by P.L. 239-1983, § 3, currently codified at 23-1.5-1-1
to -5-2)). "The [quoted] order was superseded by Admission and Discipline Rule 27 effective
January 1, 1976, amended August 31, 1976. The rule very closely parallels the original
order." Id. at n.9.
197. Birt, 370 N.E.2d at 385.
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purposeful device for protection of client interests.' 93 Birt's discussion
of the Indiana Supreme Court order also makes clear that malpractice is a
matter of lawyer regulation and as such, is appropriately superimposed

upon statutes purporting to limit malpractice liability."
Birt, like some of the lawyer-client cases discussed in this Part, can be
read for the proposition that the prohibition on the intervention of lay
intermediaries is adequately enforced by ethical training and disciplinary
rules. This view ignores the role of malpractice liability in policing the
divergence between the interests of the principal and the agent, especially
ex ante. Such policing is critical in the professional sphere where the
principal has so little ability for self protection. Among the client's few
tools for self protection is avoidance of structures which make the
professional responsive to the interests of colleagues who have no personal
stake in the appropriate treatment of the client. Taken as a whole, the
cases discussed in this Part support the conclusion that the courts' concern
in lawyer-liability issues is the lawyer-client relationship.
Courts'
discretion in exercising their powers of lawyer regulation should accordingly be informed by threats to this relationship. The material which follows
applies this conclusion to various kinds of liability.
Contract liability. A law practice's commercial contract liabilities
(rent, lights, staff salaries) seldom impact client interests in any direct or
significant way. Accordingly, courts routinely enforce limited personal
liability in connection with such commercial contracts."' Exceptions to
the general rule arise where the contract liability is directly related to client
interests, such as payments of malpractice liability insurance. South High
Development, Ltd. v. Weiner, Lippe & Cromley Co.,2 ' is an example of
a further exception where the court held that regardless of the practice
format, all the professional association's liabilities were joint and several
regardless of their nature. 2 The South High result can be attributed to
the Ohio Supreme Court's view of its powers over lawyer regulation as

198. The result in Birt-enforcinglimitation of liability for physicians organized under
a professional corporation statute-was substantially based upon this conclusion. See id. at
384. As described in the foregoing text, however, such a result is explicitly foreclosed in
the context of law practice.
North Carolina has clarified this issue by explicitly incorporating the liability provisions
of the UPA into its professional corporation statute, foreclosing the argument and rendering
professional corporation shareholders jointly and severally liable with associating
professionals. See Nelson v. Patrick, 326 S.E.2d 45 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985).
199. Birt, 370 N.E.2d at 384-85.
200. See, e.g., We're Assocs. Co. v. Cohen, Stracher & Bloom, P.C., 480 N.E.2d 357
(N.Y. 1985) (lease); KMS Energy, Inc. v. Titmas, 610 N.E.2d 1080 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992)

(rent).
201. 445 N.E.2d 1106 (Ohio 1983).
202. Id. at 1109.
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exclusive as well as paramount; more interesting, however, is the court's
belief that all practice liabilities impact on lawyer regulation. 3 Notably
in this respect, the South Carolina LLP Act does not exempt general
partners of limited liability partnerships from contract liabilities; they
remain liable as general partners. 2"
Tort liability. The limited liability statutes echo the common law rule
that renders tortfeasors liable for their own torts regardless of the form of
organization. 5 So far as non-malpractice torts are concerned, vicarious
liability in tort would engage a court's discretion only where a client's
interests, as a client, were threatened by the tort. Such cases are difficult
to imagine outside of malpractice and, as has been seen, the statutes
establish a malpractice exception to the usual tort rules.
Breaches of trust. Partners in general partnerships and LLPs are jointly
and severally liable for the firm's breaches of trust.2" 6 Because such
misdeeds normally constitute malpractice, they will not be treated
separately for present purposes.
Malpractice. Like most professional limited liability statutes, 20 7 the
South Carolina Supplement and LLP Act purport to protect professional
owner/employees from vicarious professional liability. 2 8 Only a handful
of courts have addressed whether such provisions are enforceable in favor
of lawyers. 2"
Instances of malpractice present the clearest opportunity for the court
to exercise its discretionary power to avoid liability-limiting legislation.
Both the client's interest and the attorney-client relationship are directly
threatened by a manifest divergence between the interests of principal and
agent. A court's willingness to void the legislative limitation of vicarious
malpractice liability invokes the ex ante protections provided by such
potential liability provides to the attorney-client relationship, and preserves
for the client the remedial effects of such liability. Perhaps most impor-

203. But see We'reAssocs. Co. v. Cohen, Stracher, & Bloom, P.C., 478 N.Y.S.2d 670,
675 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984) ("There is ... no basis for concluding that attorneys who
practice in a professional corporation have some exceptional legal obligation over and above
that of other professionals simply by virtue of their particular profession.").
204. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-41-370 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997).
205. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-41-370(C) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997) (LLP
members remain liable in tort); S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-44-303 cmt. (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997)
(LLC members liable for their personal torts); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6 § 18-303 (Supp. 1996)
(same)); Ditty v. Checkrite, Ltd., 973 F. Supp. 1320, 1337-38 (D. Utah 1997) (noting an
officer or director of a corporation who is also a debt collector may be held personally liable
under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act).
206. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-41-360 (Law. Co-op. 1990).
207. For exceptions, see discussion supra Part I.C.
208. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-19-340 (Law. Co-op. 1990 & Supp. 1997) (LLP).
209. See supra note 115.
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tantly, such willingness would validate, as a matter of principle, the
preservation of structures lying at the heart of the attorney-client relationship.
Why would courts foreclose the exercise of their discretionary powers
in such cases? Many persuasive arguments, illustrated by the revision of
Zagoriat in Henderson,21 ' have been put forward in favor of limiting
vicarious malpractice liability. These arguments fall into patterns: First,
vicarious malpractice liability provides more protection than is necessary
in light of malpractice insurance, personal liability of the misbehaving
lawyer, and enterprise liability. Second, disciplinary rules are adequate to
protect clients. Third, lawyers should be able to take advantage of the
corporate veil like other business owners. Fourth, the legislature, not the
courts, has jurisdiction over civil causes of action, and thus malpractice
liability falls outside the courts' supervision of lawyers. Fifth, clients'
reasonable expectations are limited to a personal relationship with
individual lawyers, not entire firms. Sixth, shareholder liability without
fault is not fair. Seventh, vicarious malpractice liability requires monitor-

ing, and monitoring is not practical in the modem law firm. The material
that follows addresses these arguments.
1. More Protection Than is Necessary
This argument overlooks two issues: one of principle and one of
practice. The issue of principle relates to a client's right to call upon the
undivided loyalty of a law practice," 2 a loyalty undercut by the presence
of supervisory interests not directly connected to client interests. As an
early commentator expressed it, "the enabling of limited liability seems an
inroad upon traditionally rigorous notions of legal responsibility. ' 213 In
this respect, courts should consider the great weight traditionally given to
the appearance of propriety and to client confidence in a justice system
oriented to serve the client's best interests.
The practical issue relates to the compensatory function of vicarious
malpractice liability. Perhaps in most cases, victims of malpractice can be
adequately compensated without resort to vicarious liability, and a court
would be justified in staying its hand. What is not clear is why a court

210. 302 S.E.2d 674 (Ga. 1983).
211. 471 S.E.2d 885 (Ga. 1996).
212. See supra note 86.
213. Note, supranote 20, at 789 (noting, with respect of active lawyers supervised by
colleagues shielded from personal liability, that "[i]f a range of professional decisions is
reserved to a board of directors, in derogation of the individual lawyer's traditional
responsibility, the expectations of clients may be defeated and the profession's tradition of
individual self-reliance and integrity impaired").
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should foreclose its ability to deal with the few remaining cases.
The argument that mandatory insurance adequately protects clients, is
not dispositive. First, and most importantly, it does not deal with the
divisiveness fostered within law firms by the new liability rules, discussed
below. Further, as a practical matter, malpractice insurance policies require
large deductibles. Who is going to pay these?214 Not every lawyer has
a quarter of a million dollars in personal assets, and probably few firms do.
Eliminating vicarious malpractice liability transfers from a firm's lawyers
to its clients the risk that the misfeasant cannot pay the malpractice
insurance deductible amount.
Finally, law firms, as a general rule, have obtained most-likely-case
malpractice insurance and have self-insured with respect to the possibility

of a judgment in excess if policy limits. "Self insuring" in this sense
relies, of course, on the personal assets of the members of the practice.
When limited-liability statutes render those members inaccessible to a
malpractice creditor, risk of a judgment in excess of policy limits shifts
from the members of the practice to the creditor-the victim. This result
can be avoided by the purchase of larger insurance policies. Absent
regulation, however, a law practice may not bother with larger insurance
policies; indeed, risk having successfully been shifted, the incentive to
insure at all would diminish. Even if larger policies are purchased, the
incremental premium cost would be externalized to clients through fees.
In short, the risk and cost of eliminating vicarious malpractice liability
are passed on to the client. Between a victim of malpractice and a lawyer
whose firm has committed malpractice, who has the greater claim on the
profits of the firm? The answer to this question has traditionally been
clear, and courts must consider as a matter of principle or practicality,
whether something has happened to justify changing that answer.
2. Disciplinary Rules are Adequate to Protect Client Interests
The thesis of the adequacy argument is that nothing in the Rules of
Professional Conduct contraindicates limiting liability, including vicarious
malpractice liability. 211 Rules 1.8, 5.4,216 and 5.1, making lawyers
liable for their colleagues' known but uncured disciplinary violations,217

214. See supra text accompanying notes 171-74 (discussing the London case).
215. Lawrence, supra note 10, at 228 ("The use of limited liability business organizations, like the LLC and LLP, by lawyers is permissible under the Model Rules. The concept
of vicarious liability is not dictated by the Rules, but is a by-product of general partnership
law.").
216. See discussion supra Part II.
217. S.C. App. CT. R. 407, Rule 5.1. (Law. Co-op. 1976).
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are cited for this proposition.28 Read in the obverse, Rule 5.1 requires
knowledge before a violation will be imputed; thus vicarious liability
appears inappropriate. This may be true for discipline, but applying the
argument to malpractice liability wrongly assumes that discipline states a
comprehensive and exclusive account of lawyer regulation.
Commentators Christensen and Bertschi219 argue that malpractice
liability does not question the courts' inherent power to regulate lawyers. o If they mean that malpractice is different than discipline, then
certainly they are correct. However, Christensen and Bertschi dramatically
overlook the role of malpractice in lawyer regulation, and therefore, the
courts' role in its supervision.
As illustrated above, and argued elsewhere," 1 the Rules do not
provide for comprehensive lawyer regulation; nor are they intended to do
so. Their role in malpractice is ambiguous. In one sense they are club
rules, and the justification and redress they offer the malpractice victim is
attenuated. In South Carolina a violation of the Rules of Professional
Conduct does not definitively establish malpractice liability, m but it may
be introduced, as evidence thereof.21 Certainly nothing in the Rules
forecloses malpractice actions, nor are they so intended.2 4
The adequacy argument should not be taken lightly because it is
consistently repeated by courts and commentators. Nevertheless, courts
should consider carefully whether, and to what extent, disciplinary rules are
potent and comprehensive enough to justify deleting an aspect of malpractice, with its ex ante and compensatory functions, and its role in fostering
public confidence.
3. Law PracticesShould be Treated Like Other Businesses"as
The least appealing argument favoring limitation of liability is that

218. Lawrence, supra note 10, at 213-217.
219. See supra note 19.
220. See Christensen & Bertschi, supra note 19, at 718.
221. Wilkins, supra note 110, at 822.
222. S.C. App. CT. IL 407, Rule 5.1 cmt. (1976) (stating that "[w]hether a lawyer may
be liable civilly or criminally for another lawyer's conduct is a question of law beyond the
scope of these Rules"); see also MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Preamble: A
Lawyer's Responsibilities (1992).
223. E.g., Allen v. Lefkoff, Duncan, Grimes & Dermer, P.C., 453 S.E.2d 719, 721 (Ga.
1995) (holding ethics rules "relevant to the standard of care in a legal malpractice action").
224. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucT Scope (1992).
225. Christensen & Bertschi, supra note 19, at 702 ("One of the primary purposes of
the Georgia LLC Act, like the Professional Corporation Act that preceded it, is to place
members of limited liability companies on a par with the shareholders of ordinary business
corporations.").
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vicarious malpractice liability is inconsistent with the "modernizing" or
commercialization of the practice of law. 6 These policy-informed
arguments simply fail to account for principle-based client interests. The
practice of law is not like other businesses because lawyers have power
over clients and control over a monopoly practice in the courts. This writer
is not convinced that lawyers have a "right" to commercial-style limitation
of liability; and in any event, if such a right exists, it surely should be
subordinate both to clients' rights and to public confidence in the undivided
loyalty of lawyers.
4. The Legislature has Power Over Civil Causes of Action
There is no question that the legislature has the power to enact limitedliability formats for use by the professions, and the general acceptance of
the professional corporation is the most obvious example. 7 Nor is there
any question that it lies within the legislative province to create and modify
civil causes of action." This issue arises when the legislature and courts
share overlapping jurisdiction. Paas, Christensen and Bertschi, and others
award legislatures exclusive jurisdiction over lawyer liability.2 9 In its
opinion in Henderson modifying the rule of Zagoria, the Georgia Supreme
Court accepts this argument at least in part. 30 Other courts have accepted it as well.'
While such commentators do not deny the power of
courts over lawyer regulation, they overlook entirely the role of malpractice

226. See Paas, supra note 21, at 379-80 (criticizing the result in South High, Paas
expresses uncertainty whether "in large law firms where day-to-day management is left to
a committee a shareholder also should be liable for the actions of his firm.... [S]uch
passive shareholders may find limited liability to be as necessary as do shareholders in a
regular business corporation"). Extending this argument to vicarious malpractice liability
proves the case for "lay intermediaries" in law practices enjoying limited vicarious
malpractice liability.
227. The legislative enactment of formats limiting professionals' liability can be seen
as the partial removal of the prior statutory impediment on the practice of law. See
Christensen & Bertschi, supra note 19, at 698.
228. Paas, supra note 21, at 383-89.

229. See Christensen & Bertschi, supra note 19, at 713; Paas, supra note 21, at 388
(arguing that court powers are limited to determining whether individuals have the fitness
or capacity to practice law and that the determination of malpractice liability falls outside
these powers and therefore is "inappropriate").
230. Henderson overruled Zagoria "to the extent it states that this court, rather than the
legislative enabling act, determines the ability of lawyers to insulate themselves" from
vicarious malpractice liability. Henderson v. HSI Fin. Servs., Inc., 471 S.E.2d 885, 886 (Ga.

1996).
231. E.g., Stewart v. Coffman, 748 P.2d 579, 582 (Utah. Ct. App. 1988) (noting that
"the Utah Supreme Court is only concerned with potential disciplinary actions and has
specifically refrained from addressing questions of civil liability").
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as a form of lawyer regulation. 232
Under legislative aegis, civil actions come and go on the basis of
policy and politics, and this is as it should be. However, with questions of
lawyer regulation the fundamental management of the courts and the
public's confidence in the legal system are at stake. Legal malpractice
involves more than a single lawyer's pocketbook. Rather, the issues

involved are many: ex ante effects and client redress; the lawyer-client
relationship; the absence of the lay intermediary; and, ultimately, public
confidence in the profession and the justice system itself. These issues
should not be subject to policy and politics and for this reason they have
been assigned to the courts. The commentators referred to above
oversimplify the issue of limitation of vicarious lawyer malpractice. At
best, the issue is one susceptible to mixed jurisdiction, and case-by-case
consideration by courts. Surely, however, courts, in determining whether
limited liability should be avoided in a particular case, should strongly
consider the extent to which court management of lawyer regulation is
involved.
This issue may be moot in states such as South Carolina where
professional use of limited liability formats is subject by statute to the rules
of the respective professions' governing bodies. 3 For lawyers this
constitutes a legislative concession of the last word to the courts. 4
5. Clients' Expectations
An early commentator raised the issue of clients' expectations vis a vis
limited liability law practice, 5 but it seems to have faded from the
debate." 6 Nevertheless, client expectations deserve weight with respect

232. Compare Christensen & Bertschi, supra note 19, at 718 ("LMiatters 'relating to the
practice of law... are within the inherent and exclusive power of the Supreme Court'...."
(quoting Carpenter v. State, 297 S.E.2d 16, 17 (Ga. 1982)), with id. at 717 ("ITihe General
Assembly has plenary power to abolish or limit causes of action and remedies, and.., such
limiting statutes do not infringe upon the powers of the courts in violation of the doctrine
of separation of powers.").
233. See supra note 100.
234. Cf S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-44-112 cmt. (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997) ("Mhe practice
of certain professionals is often subject to special conditions.").
235. Note, supra note 20, at 789 ("If... the client reasonably expects that the entire
firm is working for him, his reasonable expectations deserve to be protected and joint
liability imposed on all the members.").
236. See Paas, supra note 21, at 382-83 (alluding briefly to client expectations, but then
brushing them off, on the basis that clients cannot expect fidelity from other lawyers in the
firm unless they pay for it). At the most superficial level this argument overlooks fee
sharing among members of a practice, and fails to address client expectations as a
substantive issue relating to public confidence in the legal system.
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to clients' confidence in their lawyers and the public's image of the
profession. This is made clear by the cases taking strongly into account
putative clients' reasonable expectations concerning whether they are
represented and who represents them. 7 However, this provision of the
Rules invokes the discipline of the Rules, not malpractice liability, and
could operate only as a weak alternative to vicarious malpractice liability.
Courts considering whether to give effect to legislative limitation of
vicarious malpractice liability should give reasonable client expectations
direct weight in the context of malpractice.
6. Liability Without Fault

An issue missing from the debate, or at best present only by implica-

tion,"8 is that of the justification of liability without fault. By definition
vicarious malpractice liability is liability without fault. In our fault-based
remedial system, such liability is strong medicine, normally applied only
in cases supported by strong public policies. In the context of law practice,
the case law indicates that protection of the client's interest through the
preservation of the lawyer-client relationship is a fundamental public
policy."' This author is not convinced that any countervailing public
policy of comparable potency is engaged on behalf of limiting the liability
of owners of a corporate law practice.
Law practices typically accumulate few assets in the business. Profits
are distributed promptly to the owners for tax reasons and to protect the
profits from liabilities of the business. As is suggested above, courts
should consider who has the greater claim on profits of a law business: the
owners, or the victim of the malpractice. The courts have the power to
consider this question on a case-by-case basis.
7. Monitoring is No Longer Practical
Exposure to personal, vicarious malpractice liability encourages
monitoring by colleagues within a law practice. Those who argue against
such liability denigrate monitoring as impractical in the modem law firm,

237. See, e.g., STEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF LAwYERs: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND
ETHics 17-18, 296-310 (1995).
238. See Paas;supra note 21, at 388 (referring obliquely to this issue characterizing
vicarious malpractice liability as "punishing the innocent"). In addition to mischaracterizing
the essence of a civil action for damages, Paas overlooks the fact that the issue concerns, not
some new form of punishment being inflicted on lawyers by courts, but whether the
legislature can properly delete traditional modes of lawyer regulation and client protection
at the client's cost.
239. See supra Part III.B.
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expensive to clients, and unnecessary because of lawyers' enhanced selfmonitoring in this era of ever-greater direct malpractice exposure."'
When weighing these arguments, courts should consider practical and
principled aspects of monitoring. As a matter of principle, one can view
monitoring as crucial to the client's perception of a law practice's undivided
loyalty and duty of care. All members of a law firm are involved in
avoiding conflicts of interest, docket-minding, pinch-hitting for absent
lawyers, and other firm-wide expressions of the duty of care and loyalty.
As a practical matter, the cost of eliminating monitoring is high. If
lawyers are insulated from personal liability exposure if they do not
cooperate with or supervise other lawyers in the firm, or have knowledge
of each others' practices, one of the finn's greatest assets-its collective
memory and expertise-will be diminished, even lost. Colleagues will be
driven apart avoiding professional connection. Insulation of lawyers from
liability tends to exacerbate the problems in communications and collegiality caused by the growing commercialism of law firms.24 A significant
strength of the good law firm has always been that it was greater than the
sum of its parts. The demise of monitoring will tend to fracture the firm

240. See Rosencrantz, supra note 2, at 374-75.
241. Recently, three of the nation's most prestigious firms incurred huge liabilities for
failures of internal controls. New York's Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy agreed to
repay $1.9 million in fees in connection with accusations of conflict of interest. Paul M.
Barrett,Inside a White Shoe Law Firm'sConflict Case, WALL ST. J., Jan 23, 1998, at B1.
In a 1994 conflict of interest case, Milbank Tweed similarly was held liable for $2 million.
The Bankruptcy Judge Russell Eisenberg involved in the recent matter asked, "Was
somebody asleep on the job? Did somebody in charge not care?" Id. Hofstra Professor
Monroe Freedman believes that many large firms "don'tvigorously police potential conflicts
among their many clients." Id.
The New York firm Willkie, Farr & Gallagher also failed to disclose a conflict in a
bankruptcy matter, and the trustee recommended that the firm forfeit $4.6 million in fees.
Dean Starkman, Willkie FarrIs Criticizedfor Role in Case, WALL ST. J., Jan. 27, 1998, at
B8. The Wall Street Journal quotes the firm as characterizing the conflict as "'an
oversight."' Id.
Three weeks later The Wall Street Journal reported that the Pennsylvania Insurance
Department had assigned partial responsibility to Morgan, Lewis & Bockius for its client's
looting of two insurance companies, and that Morgan Lewis had settled the matter for $35
million. Dean Starkman, Morgan Lewis Acts to Settle Looting Case, Feb. 24, 1998, at B5.
At issue was the firm's alleged failure to monitor a lawyer. The article referred to
"problems that can develop at law firms that have grown so rapidly it is difficult for them
to keep tabs on individual lawyers." Id. The firm's malpractice policy will cover most, but
not all, of the settlement. Id. (citing to Morgan Lewis's managing partner).
These failures of internal monitoring illustrate the costs, both to clients and to the public
image of the legal profession, of the commercialization of law practice, and the accompanying degradation of internal collegiality. At the same time, limitation of vicarious malpractice
liability, by giving lawyers incentive to avoid involvement with each other's clients, would
tend further to decrease internal monitoring.
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into its parts.
8. Summary
In deciding whether to avoid legislative limitation of vicarious malpractice liability, courts will weigh substantial and oft-repeated arguments
against the incremental lawyer-regulatory effect of such liability. From the
foregoing it appears that the thread running through the arguments against
personal vicarious malpractice liability is the desire to foster the developing
Although these arguments often
commercialism of large law firms.2'
wear the clothes of economic efficiency, courts should weigh carefully
these policy-based arguments against their costs to clients, client confidence, inter-firn collegiality, and the public perception of the legal system.
The foregoing review, while brief, illustrates the absence of principled
argument sufficient to justify even an incremental diminution in the
attorney-client relationship, which necessarily follows from a limitation of
various malpractice liability.
IV.

SOUTH CAROLINA

Part III illustrated that when courts address legislative limitations of
lawyer liability they assert powers from several sources: state statutes,
express powers granted in state constitutions, and "inherent" powers of
courts. South Carolina's Supreme Court has powers of all three kinds. 43
This Part will show that the supreme court's powers, taken as a whole, are
sufficient to address lawyer regulation, and further are paramount to the
General Assembly's powers in the area of limitation of lawyers' liability.2' The supreme court has exercised its powers in a discretionary, not

242. See Lawrence, supra note 10, at 221-23.
243. Rules of practice and procedure are, of course, a special case in South Carolina.
See S.C. CoNsT. art. V, § 4 ("Subject to the statutory law, the Supreme Court shall make
rules governing the practice and procedure" in state courts.); see also Stokes v. Denmark
Emergency Med. Servs, 315 S.C. 263, 266, 433 S.E.2d 850, 852 (1993); Rutherford v.
Rutherford, 307 S.C. 199, 204, 414 S.E.2d 157, 160 (1992).
244. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-19-340 (Law. Co-op. 1990) (S.C. Professional
Corporation Supplement), S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-43-304 (repealed 1996) (1994 LLC Act),
and S.C. CODE ANN. § 3341-370 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997) (S.C. Uniform Partnership Act),
which all explicitly limit the liability of professionals in ways deleting vicarious malpractice

liability. The 1996 LLC Act does not expressly delete professional vicarious malpractice
liability. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. By leaving the issue of liability to
professional governing bodies, the 1996 LLC Act appears to present less of a legislative
incursion into lawyer regulation than the other limited liability statutes. S.C. CODE ANN. §

33-41-112 cmt. (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997) (referring to "special conditions" to which
professional LLCs are "often subject").
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245

A. Statutory Powers
In South Carolina the statutory picture is facially ambiguous.

The

South Carolina Code includes a number of provisions 246 which are
manifestly lawyer-regulatory, suggesting a sharing of lawyer regulation

between the court and General Assembly. At the same time, however, the
Code acknowledges the supreme court's plenary, inherent powers to
regulate law practice and to make rules and regulations governing
admission and discipline.247 Any remaining ambiguity is resolved by the
court's clear assertion of power over lawyer regulation, both inherent and
from constitutional sources, discussed below.
B. Constitutional Powers
Some state constitutions grant supreme courts express powers over
lawyer regulation.24 Other constitutions include a hybrid of express and

245. See infra text accompanying note 268.
246. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 40-5-60 (Law. Co-op. 1986) ("General Assembly not
precluded from prohibiting practice of law by any class."); S.C. CODE ANN. § 40-5-70 (Law.
Co-op. 1986) (State Board of Bar Examiners may make rules, consistent with "the provisions
of law and subject to the approval of the Supreme Court"); S.C. CODE ANN. § 40-5-80 (Law.
Co-op. 1986) ("Citizens not prevented from appearing in person or for others without
reward."); S.C. CODE ANN. § 40-5-220 (Law. Co-op. 1986) (license to practice granted only
by Supreme Court); S.C. CODE ANN. § 40-5-310 (Law. Co-op. 1986) ("Practicing without
being admitted and sworn prohibited" dating from 1721.); S.C. CODE ANN. § 40-5-320 (Law.
Co-op. 1986) ("Practice of law by corporations and voluntary associations unlawful."); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 40-5-330 (Law. Co-op. 1986) ("Attorneys not allowed to argue longer than
two hours" dating from 1868.); S.C. CODE ANN. § 40-5-340 (Law. Co-op. 1986) (making
the purchase of claims by lawyers a crime dating from 1868); S.C. CODE ANN. § 40-5-350
(Law. Co-op. 1986) ("Soliciting legal business unlawful."); S.C. CODE ANN. § 40-5-360
(Law. Co-op. 1986) ("Splitting fees with laymen unlawful."); S.C. CODE ANN. § 40-5-370
(Law. Co-op. 1986) (advising debtors in pooling plan deemed practice of law); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 40-5-510 (Law. Co-op. 1986) ("Removal, suspension and imprisonment of attorneys
for contempt or disorderly conduct."); S.C. CODE ANN. § 40-5-520 (Law. Co-op. 1986)
("Any attorney.. . may be removed or suspended who shall be guilty of any deceit,
malpractice or misbehavior" but only after notice and an opportunity to be heard, dating
from 1868.).
247. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 40-5-10 to -20 (Law. Co-op. 1986). These statutes do not
purport to create the powers referred to but only to acknowledge them. Accordingly, should
the legislature repeal these statutes, the powers would still exist inherently and by
constitutional mandate. See inffra note 254 and accompanying text.
248. The South Carolina Constitution mandates that the "Supreme Court shall have
jurisdiction over the admission to the practice of law and the discipline of persons admitted."
S.C. CONST. art. V, § 4. Similar provisions in Florida, FLA. CONST. art. V, § 23 (repealed),
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implied provisions that interpreted together, vest the state's supreme court
with the ultimate authority over lawyer regulation.249 In addition,
separation of powers clauses are commonly asserted as bases of court
power or jurisdiction.so
The South Carolina Supreme Court is given express "jurisdiction over
the admission to the practice of law and the discipline of persons admitted."'" The South Carolina Constitution also includes a separation of
powers clause, which the supreme court has historically invoked in
invalidating legislative incursions into what it perceives as the judicial
realm.s2 ' Other state supreme courts make similar use of such clauses,
with some relying on this basis as the sole source of court power in the
absence of express constitutional grants.253
C. Inherent Powers

The South Carolina Supreme Court has asserted inherent powers over
the practice of law, which are possessed "irrespective of specific grant ....
Such powers can neither be taken away nor abridged by the legislature." 2- Such powers are asserted even in cases of overlapping jurisdicOhio, OHIo CONST. art. IV, § 5(b), and Utah, UTAH CoNsT. art VIII, § 4, for example have
provided the basis for court approaches to legislative incursions into lawyer regulation. See
In re The Florida Bar, 133 So. 2d 554 (Fla. 1961); Stewart v. Coffman, 748 P.2d 579 (Utah
Ct. App. 1988).
249. The express constitutional creation of a supreme judicial court is construed to
include implied powers to govern the practice of law. See First Bank & Trust Co. v.
Zagoria, 302 S.E.2d 674, 675 (Ga. 1983), overruled in part by Henderson v. HSI Fin. Servs.,
Inc., 471 S.E.2d 885 (Ga. 1996); In re Bar Ass'n of Haw., 516 P.2d 1267, 1268 (Haw.
1973); In re Unification of the N.H. Bar, 248 A.2d 709, 711-12 (N.H. 1968); In re Rhode
Island Bar Ass'n, 263 A.2d 692, 693-94 (R.I. 1970).
250. S.C. CONST. art I, § 8 states that "the legislative, executive, and judicial powers
of the government shall be forever separate and distinct from each other... ." See also GA.
CONsT. art I, § 2 4; MiNN. CoNsT. art. III, § 1; R.I. CONST. art. III.
251. S.C. CoNsT. art V, § 4. The supreme court stated without citing authority that "the
Constitution imposes upon this Court the responsibility of removing from the practice those
persons whose conduct has been such that they should no longer be entrusted to represent
citizens with legal problems." In re Rushton, 286 S.C. 543, 547, 335 S.E.2d 238, 240
(1985).
252. E.g., Williams v. Bordon's, Inc., 274 S.C. 275, 262 S.E.2d 881 (1980) (holding that
a statute requiring courts to grant continuances for attorney legislators to attend legislative
sessions unconstitutionally violated separation of powers as an attempt by legislature to
exercise ultimate authority over an item inherent in the exercise of judicial power).
253. See, e.g., Singer Hutner Levine Seeman & Stuart v. Louisiana State Bar Assoc.,
378 So. 2d 423, 426 (La. 1979) (citing separation of powers clause as basis of "inherent
power which [other branches] cannot abridge" and concluding, "[t]his court will uphold
legislative acts passed in aid of its inherent power, but will strike down statutes which tend
to impede or frustrate its authority").
254. State v. Hite, 272 S.C. 303, 305, 251 S.E.2d 746, 747 (1979) (quoting 20 AM. JUR.
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tion. For example, in In re Ferguson 5 the South Carolina Supreme
Court suspended a circuit judge for misbehavior. The judge argued that his
suspension violated the constitutional limitation on the General Assembly's
power to reduce a sitting judge's salary, and further that under the
constitution he could be removed from office only through impeachment
by the General Assembly.256 The court rejected both arguments, stating
that:
[T]his Court, as the highest constitutional court, has the responsibility to protect and preserve the judicial system.... [W]e have
the inherent authority to take whatever action is necessary to
effectuate this responsibility.
... The fact the Constitution provides the Legislature with the
means to remove a circuit judge by impeachment does not preclude
this Court from exercising its inherent power to protect itself and
the public, and administer justice .... ."
The court's inherent powers can be asserted affirmatively, enabling the
judiciary to carry out its constitutional functions without legislative
direction, or negatively to exclude legislative action within its exclusive
realm." s The affirmative inherent powers of South Carolina courts arise
from the South Carolina Constitution, which provides for a unified judicial
system to be administered by the supreme court.259 The courts relied

2D Courts § 78); see also Eckles v. Atlanta Tech. Group, Inc., 485 S.E.2d 22, 25 (Ga. 1997)
("[No statute is controlling as to the civil regulation of the practice of law in this state.
Only this Court has the inherent power to govern the practice of law in Georgia."); Fleming
v. State, 270 S.E.2d 185, 188 (Ga. 1980) ("This court has the inherent power to govern the
practice of law in this State."); Reliable Collection Agency, Ltd., v. Cole, 584 P.2d 107, 113
(Haw. 1978) (The "regulation of the practice of law is inherently a function of this court.");
Board of Overseers of the Bar v. Lee, 422 A.2d 998, 1002 (Me. 1980) ("The inherent power

of the Supreme Judicial Court, therefore, arises from the very fact that it is a court and
connotes that which is essential to its existence and functioning as a court."); Washington
County Dep't of Human Servs. v. Rutter, 651 N.E.2d 1360, 1362-63 (Ohio 1995) ("'he
Supreme Court has consistently indicated that it alone has the inherent power to regulate,
control, and define the practice of law in Ohio."); Berberian v. Kane, 425 A.2d 527, 527
(R.I. 1981) ("In the exercise of its inherent power to regulate the practice of law and the
conduct of attorneys, this court has from time to time promulgated rules in explication and
implementation of professional responsibility.").
255. 304 S.C. 216, 403 S.E.2d 628 (1991).
256. Id. at 218-19, 403 S.E.2d at 629-30.
257. Id. at 218, 403 S.E.2d at 630 (citations omitted). The court further observed that
constitutional provisions intended to protect judges from the General Assembly do not
protect judges from the supreme court. Id. at 219, 403 S.E.2d at 630.
258. CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHics §§ 2.2.2 to .3 (1986).
259. S.C. CONST. art. V, § 4.
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upon such power to suspend a circuit judge,2 ° to appoint lawyers to
serve without pay in civil cases,26 ' to punish for contempt,262 and to
discipline lawyers.263

The negative inherent powers of South Carolina courts derive from the
separation of powers doctrine that requires the legislative, executive, and
judicial branches be "forever separate and distinct" and that no branch
"assume or discharge the duties of any other.'' 2 4 Under the most
extreme expression of the separation of powers doctrine, any attempt by
one branch to interfere with the duties of another is unconstitutional,265
and therefore, ultra vires and void. The South Carolina Supreme Court has
not expressly adopted this most extreme view. The court has invoked its
negative inherent powers as necessary, however, to protect its powers over
the regulation of law practice. For example, the court invalidated a statute
mandating that courts grant continuances to lawyer-legislators on days
when the General Assembly is in session2 and prevented the South
Carolina Probation, Parole and Pardon Board from paroling a person held
in contempt of court.267 Ultimately, of course, the court determines what
the constitution means, 268 and its decisions are unreviewable. Without
question then, South Carolina courts have the power to regulate the practice
of law and to override legislative acts impinging upon this power.
The supreme court uses a voidable, or discretionary, approach to deal
with legislative incursions. For example, the court in State v. Hite
determined that legislative incursions into court powers are not void but
should be weighed to determine whether the incursion deprives the court
of "'sufficient power to protect itself from indignities and to enable it
effectively to administer its judicial functions.' 269 The court's adoption
of a discretionary approach will require it, in an appropriate case, to
determine under what circumstances the court should employ its powers in

260. See In re Ferguson, 304 S.C. 216, 403 S.E.2d 628 (1991).
261. See Hanaas v. State, 279 S.C. 592, 310 S.E.2d 440 (Ct. App. 1983).
262. See State v. Brantley, 279 S.C. 215, 305 S.E.2d 234 (1983); State ex rel. McLeod
v. Hite, 272 S.C. 303, 251 S.E.2d 746 (1979).
263. See Bums v. Clayton, 237 S.C. 316, 117 S.E.2d 300 (1960).
264. S.C. CONST. art. I, § 8; see also Williams v. Bordon's, Inc., 274 S.C. 275, 279, 262
S.E.2d 881, 883-84 (1980).
265. VOLFRAM, supra note 258, § 2.2.3, at 27.

266. See Williams, 274 S.C. at 275, 262 S.E.2d at 881.
267. See Hite, 272 S.C. at 303, 251 S.E.2d at 746.
268. State ex rel. McLeod v. Yonce, 274 S.C. 81, 85, 261 S.E.2d 303, 305 (1979)
("There is no authority save the court to determine when there is and when there is not a
violation of the separation of powers of the constitution."). Evatte v. Cass, 217 S.C. 62, 65,
59 S.E.2d 638, 639 (1950).
269. Hite, 272 S.C. at 306, 251 S.E.2d at 748 (quoting M.C. Dransfield, Annotation,
Power to Punishfor Contempt, 121 A.L.R. 215, 239 (1939)).
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the context of legislated limited liability for lawyers.
We must wait for such a case to see how the court will employ these
270 where the
powers. A hint, perhaps, is provided in In re Jacobson,
court wrote that "the practice of law is a profession-not a business or
skilled trade."27' Expanding upon Jacobson some twenty years later,
Chief Judge Sanders of the South Carolina Court of Appeals wrote, "We

are also not willing to abandon the historic distinction between occupations
and professions,
despite recent infusions of commercialism into the
272
latter."
V. CONCLUSION
The essence of the lawyer-client relationship and the Rules of
Professional Conduct is the minimization of the divergence between the
interests of lawyer and client. Vicarious malpractice liability minimizes
such divergence by connecting all lawyers in the practice to the client.
Elimination of vicarious malpractice liability tends to encourage divergence
by creating a class of supervisory lawyers within the practice that have no
direct connection to clients. On a practical level, elimination of vicarious
malpractice liability shifts to clients a risk and cost traditionally born by
lawyers. The result is a commercial advantage principally accruing to a
relatively few large firms.
Some have labelled vicarious malpractice liability a historical accident,
not a principled aspect of the lawyer-client relationship;273 however, such
characterizations overlook the essential role of malpractice in lawyer
regulation. As a tool for lawyer regulation, malpractice does not depend
for authority on statutes or disciplinary rules, but instead on the courts'
responsibility to regulate law practice. Perhaps the modem practice of law
requires limited liability. But at the very least, courts should consider the
effect on lawyer regulation of an elimination of vicarious malpractice
liability. As the supreme court of Oklahoma expressed the point, "One of
the most important public interests of the courts of this state is the integrity
of the bar and the regulation of its members."'274 Certainly the courts
have the power to do what they deem to be in the best interests of the
practice and the public.

270. 240 S.C. 436, 126 S.E.2d 346 (1962).
271. Id. at 448, 126 S.E.2d at 353.
272. Hamaas v. State, 279 S.C. 592, 596, 310 S.E.2d 440, 442-43 (Ct. App. 1983).
273. See Birt, 370 N.E.2d 379, 384 (Ind.Ct. App. 1977); Lawrence, supra note 10, at
228 ("The concept of vicarious liability is not dictated by the Rules, but is a by-product of
general partnership law.").
274. American Nat'lBank & Trust Co. v. Clarke & Van Wagner, Inc., 692 P.2d 61, 68
(Okla. Ct. App. 1984).
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